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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF GEORGIA’S ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM ON SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE AND SUBGROUP POPULATIONS 
By 
ASHLEY LYNN CUSTARD 
MAY 2014 
Committee Chair: Dr. Mary Beth Walker 
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation examines the impact of Georgia’s accountability system on both school 
and student performance. We focus on two components within Georgia’s accountability system – 
the sanctioning of failing schools and binding subgroup requirements. Schools within Georgia 
become subject to sanctions upon two consecutive years of failing to show Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP). The subgroup binding requirements, introduced by the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) Act, hold schools independently responsible for the performance of given subgroups 
contingent upon enrollment.  
The first question of this dissertation examines the factors that influence a school’s ability 
to meet assessment standards. We examine the relative importance of school characteristics, as 
they relate to accountability components, in determining AYP in practice. A binary response 
model is used as AYP is determined on a pass/fail basis. More specifically, we apply a correlated 
random effects probit model with a Chamberlain-Mundlak adjustment. The second question of 
this dissertation examines the impact of binding requirements on subgroup performance, where 
subgroup performance is defined as the percentage of students scoring at or above proficiency. 
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We employ a regression discontinuity design that compares the performance of bounded and 
unbounded subgroups to determine the treatment effect. Each question of this dissertation is 
addressed through evaluating both mean and distributional effects.  
We find that imposing sanctions on failing schools has a positive impact on future 
performance. However, increasing the number of binding requirements has a negative impact on 
a school’s probability of passage. This result suggests that heterogeneous schools, or schools 
with several large subgroup populations, are negatively impacted by the requirement. While we 
find that accountability components have a statistically significant impact on probability of AYP 
passage, factors related to school resources and quality appear to have a greater influence.  
The mechanism for the negative impact of binding requirements remains unidentified as 
we also find that binding requirements have a slight positive impact on individual subgroup 
performance. The magnitude of this impact is dependent upon the subgroup examined, school 
type, and position of the subgroup within the Meets/Exceeds distribution. Overall, our results 
suggest the need for re-examination of the binding requirements as a method of targeting 
disadvantaged populations.  
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2002, determining the impact of 
accountability systems has become increasingly important. Previous legislation focused on 
providing greater resources, but the emphasis has sense shifted to “standards, testing, and 
accountability” (Hanushek & Raymond 2005). One of the primary goals of NCLB, and any other 
accountability system, is to increase the performance of historically disadvantaged groups such 
as minorities and those of low socio-economic status. The persistence of the achievement gap, an 
issue of both class and race, highlights the need for policies targeting these populations. NCLB 
required the implementation of statewide accountability systems that applied uniform standards 
to all students and held schools independently accountable for the achievement of given 
subgroups. The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the success of NCLB components 
in Georgia, and determine whether holding schools responsible for subgroup populations 
(dependent on student enrollment) has been effective in increasing academic achievement within 
these groups. The results found reflect the influence of accountability structures on performance, 
as measured by subgroup achievement and ability to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). 
Under NCLB all states were required to create statewide accountability programs 
promoting improvement in student achievement. Those states with accountability systems in 
place prior to NCLB’s passage were forced to alter these systems to comply with federal 
requirements. Federal law mandated annual testing of all students in grades 3-8 and the testing of 
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all high school students at least once during their high school academic career.  The results of 
these tests are made available to the public and used to determine Adequate Yearly Progress, a 
measure evaluating overall school performance. A major component of AYP examines the 
percentage of students scoring at or above proficiency on state-administered standardized exams. 
Schools not meeting these criteria are labeled as “Needs Improvement” and become subject to 
sanctions. Available sanctions include school choice, the provision of mandatory tutoring, 
dismissal of faculty and/or administration, as well as government takeover. The premise of 
accountability systems being that threat of sanctions will alter school behavior.  
Georgia’s response to the implementation of NCLB was the passage of the Single 
Statewide Accountability System (SSAS) in 2005. Scoring standards were applied to all students 
collectively as well as certain targeted populations or subgroups. The original conditions of 
NCLB mandated that Georgia show improvement in student achievement for every student 
category, including subgroups, until reaching 100 percent proficiency in the 2013-2014 school 
year
1. Georgia’s designated subgroups included Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, 
American Indian/Alaskan, white, multi-racial, students with disabilities (SWD)
 2
, students with 
limited English proficiency (LEP), and the economically disadvantaged (ED).  
The first question of this dissertation focuses on factors that influence AYP status, 
including but not limited to the components of the accountability system itself. While the 
ultimate determination of AYP uses three well defined measures, accountability structures may 
indirectly influence performance. In essence we are examining the relative importance of school 
                                                 
1
 In 2013, Georgia replaced the Adequate Yearly Progress objectives of NCLB with its own College and Career 
Readiness Performance Index (CCRPI). The CCRPI also includes measures of achievement for a set of subgroups – 
the economically disadvantaged, students with disabilities, and those with limited English proficiency. 
2
 States may use modified achievement standards or alternate assessments to track the progress of students with 
disabilities. For those students who are required participate in Georgia’s testing procedures but have significant 
cognitive disabilities the Georgia Alternate Assessment (GAA) is administered.        
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characteristics, as they translate to accountability components, in determining AYP in practice. A 
binary response model is used to measure the effect of these factors since AYP is determined on 
a pass/fail basis. Data elements come from the Georgia Department of Education (GADOE) as 
well as the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Both static and dynamic models are 
estimated as the impact of underperformance and subsequent sanctions may carry over into 
future years.  
The individual performance of a subgroup is used in a school’s AYP determination if and 
only if student enrollment within that particular subgroup reaches a given threshold. The number 
of enrolled students must equal forty or total ten percent of students enrolled in AYP grades in 
order for a school to be held independently accountable for a particular subgroup. Therefore, all 
schools within the state will not be held accountable for every group. It is this aspect of SSAS 
that the second question of this dissertation will exploit in exploring the impact of accountability 
on subgroup achievement. A sharp regression discontinuity design is used to compare the 
achievement of those subgroups with enrollment just below the cutoff to those with enrollment 
just exceeding the cutoff.  Subgroups and consequently schools with enrollment levels exceeding 
the threshold are categorized as ‘treated’ because they face greater pressure to improve 
achievement within binding subgroups. The data used contain detailed AYP reports for each 
school in Georgia dating from 2004-2011. Additional information on student body demographics 
and teacher characteristics was obtained from the GADOE and NCES.   
When investigating the impact of accountability systems on student performance several 
key questions arise: Are these systems effective in improving student achievement? If effective, 
what factors contribute to success? Are there differential effects by race/ethnicity or location in 
the achievement distribution? The accountability literature consists of studies undertaken in an 
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attempt to answer these questions. One branch of literature focuses on comparisons of 
accountability systems across states (Carnoy & Loeb 2002; Hanushek & Raymond 2003, 2005). 
These studies construct indices measuring the relative strength of each state’s system, and 
compare student outcomes in ‘weak’ systems to those in ‘strong’ systems. These national studies 
serve to exploit variation between states, as all schools within a state face simultaneous 
implementation. Therefore, within state differences are not explored. This dissertation 
contributes to the existing literature by using variation in the application of accountability within 
the state of Georgia as opposed to variation in the time or method of implementation across 
states.  
Studies focusing on individual state systems may examine state-specific components and 
therefore produce results that are highly specific and not generalizable. This dissertation 
investigates components within Georgia’s system that are found nationwide –sanction threat and 
subgroup accountability. While the exact nature of each may vary from state to state, NCLB 
mandated that both be incorporated into all state systems.  
The application of the regression discontinuity within this study is also distinctive. 
Though many authors have used a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the impact of 
issuing ‘grades’ to schools based on performance (Figlio & Rouse 2006; Rockoff & Turner 
2010; Chiang 2009; Chakrabarti 2013) or to examine the impact of performance standards on 
achievement (Hemelt 2011), few have used the design to examine differences in populations for 
which schools are held accountable.  
Again, this dissertation addresses two main questions: What is the impact of given 
accountability structures, the application of sanctions and the number of subgroup binding 
requirements, on probability of AYP passage? How do binding requirements impact subgroup 
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performance? Each question is tackled by examining Georgia’s accountability system, analyzing 
evidence found within the literature, presenting the data available, describing methodologies  
used, evaluating results, and reporting the conclusions drawn. Consistent with the literature 
(Carnoy & Loeb 2002; Hanushek & Raymond 2005; West & Peterson 2006; Figlio & Rouse 
2006; Hastings & Weinstein 2008; Ahn & Vigdor 2013) we find that imposing sanctions has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on a school’s probability of passing AYP. However, 
our findings also show that increasing the number of binding subgroup requirements has a 
negative impact on the probability of AYP passage. The mechanism for this negative relationship 
remains unidentified as we also find that binding requirements have a positive influence on the 
performance of subgroup populations.   
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter II describes the 
theoretical framework for accountability systems, more specifically it speaks to the theories that 
support the use of accountability systems in improving student achievement; Chapter III 
examines the impact of accountability components on probability of AYP passage; Chapter IV 
analyzes the impact of binding requirements on subgroup performance; and Chapter V presents 
the conclusions of this study.   
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Chapter II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The education production function (EPF) maps the relationship between educational 
inputs and student achievement. The objective is to maximize student performance given a set of 
constraints. While there is no clear consensus on the factors relevant to determining student 
performance (Hanushek & Raymond 2005), the simplest form of the EPF is as follows:  
 
Ys = f (Bs, Ps, SCs),                                                                                                           (1)                                        
 
where Ys represents the selected student outcome,  Bs are student and family background 
characteristics, Ps are characteristics of peers within the school, and SCs are school inputs. 
Socioeconomic status and parents’ education are often used as measures of student background 
characteristics (Hanushek 2008). School demographics and/or school-level measures of 
achievement can serve as proxies for peer effects (Hanushek 2008).  For example, measures of 
racial composition can be used to test the influence of minority concentration on achievement. 
School-level measures of income, such as the percentage of students qualifying for Free or 
Reduced Lunch, and school-level measures of performance, such passage rates on standardized 
tests, can also serve as proxies for peer effects. School inputs or resources are usually defined as 
teacher experience, pupil/teacher ratio, expenditures, etc.  
The education production function establishes a relationship between student 
characteristics, school characteristics, and educational achievement. The introduction of an 
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accountability system creates pressure for increased academic performance.  Schools must adjust 
inputs within the production function to maximize output under an altered set of constraints. 
These adjustments can take several forms. Due to limitations in the ability of schools to 
significantly alter their student populations, modifications in student characteristics or family 
background as a means to improve achievement are limited. Literature suggests that the main 
mechanisms of increasing academic achievement occur through changes to school policy. For 
instance teachers may focus on marginal students, or students whose scores place them slightly 
below the passage point (Gillborn & Youdell 2000; Springer 2007; Hamilton et al. 2007; Rouse, 
Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio 2013). Schools may reallocate resources to increase focus on 
tested subjects or test-specific skills (Jacob 2002; Reback 2008), increase the resources made 
available to teachers (Hemelt 2011), or extend the time devoted to instruction (Hamilton et al. 
2007; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio 2013; Hemelt 2011). While the purpose of this 
dissertation is not to identify the individual school policies through which improvement occurs, it 
is important acknowledge these mechanisms as it helps to define accountability systems within 
the structure of the education production function.  
As noted above, accountability systems assume that schools have the capacity to respond 
to incentives and improve student outcomes through manipulation of the education production 
function. The threat of sanctions and the disclosure of quality ratings are meant to incentivize 
schools to increase student performance. However it is important to note that the degree to which 
institutions respond to accountability threats is dependent upon several factors. These factors 
include threat credibility, dissemination of information, institution autonomy, and availability of 
resources. Threat credibility refers to the perceived likelihood of sanctions. If states do not 
consistently impose sanctions, this negates the perceived threat and provides no incentive for 
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improvement. NCLB and consequently SSAS mandate corrective action on schools who do not 
meet statewide standards. The sanctions are hierarchical in nature, with the most severe resulting 
in school restructuring. During the six year period from 2006 to 2011, an average of 117 schools 
per year faced restructuring in Georgia.  
The dissemination of information refers to the degree to which student achievement 
results are made publicly available. In making achievement information available, the issue of 
asymmetric information between schools and their surrounding communities is reduced. 
Consumers are allowed to judge the quality of the good being provided, placing external pressure 
on schools to increase student achievement.  Under NCLB low-performing schools are required 
to facilitate and fund the transfer of any student who wishes to do so. NCLB also required the 
publication of report cards documenting academic achievement. However, Georgia began 
publishing report cards in the year 2000, several years prior to the passage of NCLB.  
Autonomy and the availability of resources dictate the extent to which schools are able to 
alter their curriculum and staff to adhere to accountability standards. For example, NCLB 
contains language which focuses on the improvement of teacher quality. The act mandates 
certification requirements for any teacher teaching a core subject such as math or reading. Each 
state was also required to implement programs to guarantee that all teachers were ‘highly 
qualified’ by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. In the state of Georgia, a ‘highly qualified’ 
teacher is defined as having a bachelor’s degree, full certification, and verified mastery of 
teaching skills and subject knowledge. The ability to hire and retain these teachers is influenced 
by the resources available, which can itself be influenced by previous performance. 
The research presented here uses the education production function framework to 
examine two questions concerning the impact of accountability systems. The first studies the 
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influence of accountability components as defined through school characteristics on AYP status. 
The second explores the impact of binding subgroup requirements on a different outcome, 
student performance as measured through achievement rates. While the two outcomes examined 
differ, the mechanisms for improvement remain unchanged. Under accountability systems 
schools are charged with improving student performance through the manipulation of 
educational inputs while facing given accountability structures and limited availability of school 
resources.  
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Chapter III 
ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
COMPONENTS  
 
History of Accountability in Georgia 
 Prior to the passage of NCLB in 2002, the state of Georgia was in the process of 
developing its own accountability system entitled the “A+ Education Reform Act of 2000.” Like 
many other systems the focus of “A+” centered on improving teacher quality, decreasing the 
number of dropouts, and increasing student test scores. However, it also contained measures to 
decrease school violence, increase community involvement, and increase the level of integration 
between educational agencies within the state. This last goal was achieved through the creation 
of the Education Coordinating Council. The act also created the Office of Education 
Accountability (OEA) – later renamed the Governor’s Office of Student Achievement - whose 
primary responsibilities focused on developing and implementing Georgia’s accountability 
system. The original plan dictated that schools receive a grade of A-F based on the standards 
created by the OEA.  However, prior to the enactment of A+, NCLB was passed and Georgia’s 
system was revamped to adhere to federal guidelines.  
 The new system, SSAS, held many of the same goals as its predecessor; however it went 
about achieving these goals in a different manner. In SSAS, AYP status was defined as a binary 
indicator of performance as opposed to scaled letter grades. Schools either pass or fail their AYP 
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determination. Those who meet AYP have satisfied the following criteria: 1.) 95 % testing 
participation for every subgroup – including the ‘all student’ subgroup; 2.) Achievement in 
English/language arts (ELA) and mathematics in accordance with Annual Measurable 
Objectives; 3.) Passage of a Second Indicator. The first criterion, 95% participation in all 
subgroups, is meant to minimize the exclusion of underperforming students as a way to ensure 
success. Annual Measurable Objectives (AMOs) are benchmarks stating the minimum 
percentage of students scoring at or above proficiency required for a school to qualify as having 
made adequate progress. For instance, the AMO in math for high school students in the 2010-
2011 school year was 81.2%, meaning that in order to pass at least 81.2% of students tested must 
score at or above proficiency
3
. It is important to note that in Georgia, if schools fail to meet the 
absolute bar set by the AMO, there are three other alternatives: confidence intervals, multi-year 
averaging, and a safe harbor method. The safe harbor method uses performance from the 
previous year as a benchmark and requires a decrease of ten percent in the number of students 
not meeting proficiency. The third criterion focuses on a second indicator of overall performance 
that is not generally applied to subgroup populations but to the school as a whole. Only those 
subgroup populations meeting AMO through the safe harbor method are also held accountable 
for the second indicator. Elementary and middle schools are allowed to use a variety of 
indicators such as attendance rates or the percent of students exceeding the standard in a given 
subject area as their second indicator. For high schools the second indicator is the graduation 
rate. The use of graduation rate as opposed to attendance or achievement scores may place high 
schools at a disadvantage in terms of ability to pass AYP
4
. Figure 1 is a visual representation of  
 
 
                                                 
3
 A listing of Annual Measurable Objectives (AMOs) by year and subject is available in Appendix A 
4
 High School AYP Second Indicator Graduation Rate Standards are available in Appendix B 
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Figure 1. Adequate Yearly Progress Determination 
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the AYP determination process. After all calculations are performed an accountability profile is 
constructed for each school containing its AYP report, a performance index recognizing those 
schools making the greatest gains in achievement, and performance highlights listing each 
school’s best performance indicators.  
Once constructed accountability profiles are used to determine rewards received or 
sanctions administered. Those schools demonstrating the greatest gains and those with the 
highest absolute scores are eligible for rewards under SSAS.  The law states that rewards can be 
both monetary and non-monetary. Banners of recognition, visits from the governor, banquets, 
and increased autonomy are the non-monetary awards offered. And while the possibility of 
financial rewards for above average performance is written into Georgia law, very few have 
actually been given. Title I schools who have made AYP for four consecutive years are the only 
school type that has received a financial reward for progress made. All other schools exhibiting 
excellence in performance have received banners of recognition or some other form on non-
monetary reward.  
In the 2002-2003 school year, the first year in which Georgia calculated Adequate Yearly 
Progress, 63.7% of Georgia schools met AYP while the state as a whole failed. The first year of 
the panel used for this analysis is 2004, and the percentage of schools achieving AYP increased 
to 79.76% in this year. As can be seen in Table1, the percentage of schools passing AYP peaked 
in the 2009-2010 school year with approximately 86% of schools meeting the standard. In 2011, 
approximately 27% of schools in Georgia failed to make AYP and faced possible sanction. This 
was the largest percentage of failures since the inception of NCLB in 2003. The sanction 
structure of SSAS was taken directly from NCLB. Whether or not a school faces sanctions is 
dependent not only on current year’s performance, but on the previous year’s status as well. 
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Table 1. Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) Percentages by Year, 2004-2011 
Year # of Schools Failed AYP Met AYP     
2004 1,932 20.24% 79.76% 
  2005 1,966 17.75% 82.25% 
  2006 2,011 20.14% 79.86% 
  2007 2,021 17.42% 82.58% 
  2008 2,052 19.40% 80.60% 
  2009 2,104 13.64% 86.36% 
  2010 2,114 21.85% 78.15% 
  2011 2,179 26.66% 73.34%     
NOTE: Compiled using Georgia Department of Education, Needs Improvement Reports, 2004-2011 
 
 “Needs Improvement Status” contains the following five categories: 
1. Distinguished – Has met standards for three consecutive years 
2. Adequate Progress – Has met standards for two consecutive years 
3. Adequate Progress, Did Not Meet – Met standards for the two previous years but failed to 
meet in the most recent. 
4. Needs Improvement, Made AYP – Met standards for the most current year but was 
previously classified as Needs Improvement. 
5. Needs Improvement – Has failed to meet AYP for two consecutive years. 
During the first year of “Needs Improvement” schools must facilitate the transfer of students 
who wish to attend a better performing school and develop a school improvement plan. The next 
level of sanctions requires schools to provide supplemental services to low-achieving students. 
Each subsequent stage shows an increase in government intervention culminating in yearly 
evaluations by both the school system and Georgia Department of Education.  In order to move 
out of the Needs Improvement category, schools must satisfy AYP for two consecutive years.  
Table 2 displays the number of schools present within each Needs Improvement category by 
year.  
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Table 2. Percentage of Schools in each Needs Improvement Status by Year, 2004-2011 
School Year # of Schools 
Needs 
Improvement 
Needs 
Improvement - 
Made AYP 
Adequate - 
Did NOT 
Make AYP 
Adequate Distinguished 
2004 1,932 14.60% 6.73% 5.02% 60.66% 12.99% 
2005 1,966 9.82% 7.73% 7.63% 18.92% 55.90% 
2006 2,011 10.04% 4.92% 9.70% 12.33% 63.00% 
2007 2,021 10.74% 4.90% 6.04% 11.88% 66.45% 
2008 2,052 9.26% 4.78% 9.89% 12.23% 63.84% 
2009 2,104 8.46% 4.23% 5.04% 15.54% 66.73% 
2010 2,114 9.37% 2.93% 11.83% 11.45% 64.43% 
2011 2,179 13.22% 3.17% 13.03% 10.56% 60.03% 
NOTE: Table compiled using Georgia Department of Education, Needs Improvement Reports, 2004-2011 
 
Figures 2 and 3 document the passage rate for the Criterion-Referenced Competency 
Tests (CRCT)
5
 and Georgia High School Graduation Tests (GHSGT) in math and 
English/language arts from 2003 through 2011. Students in third through eighth grades are tested 
in English/language arts and mathematics using CRCTs. High school students, 11
th
 graders 
specifically, are tested in the same subject areas using the GHSGTs.  For schools serving grades 
not covered by the CRCT or GHSGT, AYP determinations are made using other forms of 
assessments as the U.S. Department of Education requires that all schools be subject to AYP 
evaluations. For example, End of Course Tests (EOCTs) are used for ninth grade centers, and the 
Kindergarten Assessment Program is used for Kindergarten-only schools.  
At the inception of NCLB, approximately 78% of students taking the CRCT in English/ 
language arts met the standard, while only 71% of students met the standard in mathematics. As 
can be seen from Figure 3, the percentage of high school students scoring at or above proficiency  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Criterion-reference tests are designed to measure how well student achievement adheres to a specific curriculum, 
which in Georgia included Quality Core Curriculum (QCC) and Georgia Performance Standards (GPS). Norm-
referenced tests measure more general subjects/skills that are taught throughout the country.  
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Figure 2. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject & Year, CRCT – All Students, 2003-2011  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject & Year, GHSGT – All Students, 2003-2011 
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in ELA hovered around 90% for the duration of the period. The passage rate for the mathematics  
portion of the GHSGT began at around 90% in 2003, but decreased to approximately 74% in 
2004 after the introduction of the “Enhanced-GHSGT.” Both figures highlight that a larger 
percentage of students meet the standard in ELA than in mathematics. The difference in 
percentage passing is more pronounced for students taking the GHSGT than students taking the 
CRCT.  
 
Literature Review – Impact of Accountability Systems on Achievement 
National Studies 
As stated previously, NCLB required that each state create an accountability system that 
held all schools within the state to a uniform set of standards. While NCLB mandated system 
creation, state governments were given discretion in implementation. This discretion created 
variation in the standards applied across states. The presence of pre-existing systems combined 
with variation in standards makes a national study of the impact of NCLB difficult. One 
approach has looked at trends in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and 
sought to determine if the implementation of NCLB had a noticeable impact. Ladd (2007) 
performs such a test, looking at trends in math and reading for both 4
th
 and 8
th
 graders from 1992 
to 2007. She discovers the decline in eighth grade reading scores and growth in math scores 
follow the pre-NCLB trend. Therefore, neither eighth nor fourth grade scores provide clear 
evidence of a positive impact of NCLB. Cronin, Kingsbury, McCall, and Bowe (2005) also 
investigate the initial impact of NCLB on a national scale. Using individual level data from 200 
districts in 23 states, the authors compare pre and post- NCLB scores to determine the act’s 
impact on performance levels and growth. Findings show that growth in student scores decreased 
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for every ethnic group, grades with mandatory testing experienced greater gains than those 
without, and minority students fared worse than whites in both growth and levels of attainment.  
Other studies have chosen to focus on the impact of accountability as a whole as opposed 
to simply focusing on NCLB. In 2002, Carnoy and Loeb conducted a study investigating the 
impact of the relative strength of an accountability system on student outcomes. The authors 
developed an index of accountability strength using the presence of state achievement tests, 
rewards and/or sanctions, and high school exit exams. The scale ranged from zero to five. Those 
states with no tests or state standards received zeros, and those with statewide tests, well-
developed reward/sanction systems, and mandatory high school exit exams received fives. 
Georgia’s pre-NCLB system of 1999-2000 warranted an index rating of two. While statewide 
testing and high school exit exams were present, the state lacked a system of rewards or 
sanctions. Using math scores at the eighth grade level, the authors determine that those states 
with ‘stronger’ systems saw greater improvements in student performance. This study not only 
showed that holding schools responsible increases performance, but that holding students 
accountable, in this case through high school exit exams, has a positive impact on performance.  
Using NAEP data Hanushek and Raymond (2005) investigate the impact of state 
accountability systems on student achievement. The authors divide states into two categories, 
“Consequential” states that add direct consequences to underperformance, and “Report Card” 
states that simply publish results. The study focused on the performance of Black, Hispanic, and 
white eighth graders, and found that accountability programs had a positive impact. Those states 
which implemented consequential systems early showed the greatest improvement. Overall the 
authors find a significant gain in performance with the introduction of accountability.  
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State-specific Studies 
Another branch of the literature focuses on state or district-specific systems. Jacob (2002) 
studies the impact of high-stakes testing in Chicago public schools. Implemented in the 1996-
1997 school year, the system held students, teachers, and schools accountable. Students faced the 
elimination of ‘social promotion.’ A passing grade on state administered tests was now required 
for promotion of students in third, sixth, and eighth grades. Teachers and administrators were 
subject to dismissal or reassignment, and schools were subject to sanctions including 
restructuring if students consistently failed to meet state standards.  As seen in most studies of 
this type the positive impact of accountability appears to be larger for math than for reading. One 
possible explanation being that the skills needed to increase math scores can be taught in the 
classroom, while the skill set for reading is more greatly influenced by outside factors. This 
study also examined whether improvement in scores occurred due to an increase in general or 
test-specific skills. If improvement was due to an increase in general skill, gains made should 
carry over to other state administered tests. Results showed no improvement in any other state 
administered test, and therefore implied that students increased their test-specific skills. In fact, 
Jacob found that accountability had a slightly negative impact on scores of alternate tests. 
Previous achievement had a noticeable impact on gains in tested subjects such as math and 
science, but little to no impact on gains in non-tested subjects. Suggesting that accountability 
systems cause shifts in resources towards tested subjects.  
Rockoff and Turner (2010) study New York City’s accountability system. In 2007 New 
York City implemented a program which assigned schools letter grades ranging from A-F based 
on student performance (30%), student progress (55%), and school environment (15%). The 
calculations made are separate from New York’s NCLB determinations. Each school’s 
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performance is evaluated relative to similar schools within the city. Schools of the same type and 
schools with similar student populations are considered comparable to one another. Well-
performing schools receive financial rewards such as increases in per pupil spending and 
principal bonuses. Low-performing schools are subject to sanctions including student transfer, 
closure, and other corrective action. Letter grades are released in September, and students are 
tested the following January leaving the schools several months to respond to their rating.  The 
authors use the discontinuous nature of grade assignment to identify the impact of accountability 
on performance. Schools are assigned letter grades based on their relative position in the 
distribution of comparable schools, but are later able to obtain additional credit. The authors note 
that at least 161 schools received additional credit which moved them to a higher grade. The 
results show schools receiving a grade of D or F in math and those receiving an F in English 
showed significant improvement. The short-run impact of receiving an F was a reduction in the 
achievement gap between C and F schools. There was an 18% reduction in math, and a 20% 
reduction in English. Schools receiving D’s saw a 16% reduction in the A-D school achievement 
gap in math.  
Mechanisms for Improvement 
Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, and Figlio (2013) not only determine the impact of 
accountability on student achievement but investigate the mechanisms through which these 
improvements take place. Florida’s system, like many others, assigns letter grades based on 
performance measures. Those schools receiving an F in the previous year saw a long-lasting 
increase in both math and reading scores, implying a positive impact of sanctions. The authors 
determine the proportion of gains made that can be attributed to changes in school policy. In 
response to accountability, schools increased the focus on low achieving students, increased 
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resources made available to teachers, extended time devoted to instruction (summer school, 
tutoring, etc.), and decreased principal control. The authors also estimate the impact of school 
failure and the subsequent implementation of corrective school policy. They control for school-
level variables such as enrollment, expenditure per student, percentage receiving Free or 
Reduced Lunch etc. Implementing corrective school policy accounted for over 15 percent of 
reading gains and 38 percent of gains in math.  
Hamilton et al. (2007) find evidence suggesting that schools within the state of Georgia 
altered school policy in response to accountability pressure. Instructional time appeared to be 
reallocated from non-tested towards tested subjects in the time period immediately following the 
passage of the act.  This effect was seen most prominently in elementary schools, as elementary 
teachers have more freedom in their schedule and can thus reallocate time more easily. The study 
also found that schools began to give additional attention to those students closest to the passage 
benchmark.  
Response to Failure 
How do schools respond to previous bad ratings? Do low-performing schools respond to 
low-ratings through improvements in achievement in later years? Several studies have found that 
failed or threatened schools show persistent improvements in achievement (Chiang 2009; 
Chakrabarti 2013). Hemelt (2011) finds negative impacts of failure in the short-run, but 
improved performance of failed subgroups in the long run. And similar to the Hamilton et al. 
(2007) results, accountability threats resulted in increased spending on instruction and teacher 
development.  Figlio and Rouse (2006) find the scores of students in low-performing schools 
showed a larger increase than those of students in schools with high performance. Gains were 
seen in both low and high-stakes tests. However, gains in low-stakes reading exams were 
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explained by differences in student characteristics, and low-stakes math gains were only present 
in grades that were also subject to high-stakes testing. The authors also note that voucher threats 
were not responsible for the improvements seen in math scores; instead they attribute the growth 
to other accountability pressures such as performance bonuses or the stigma of receiving a low 
grade. While voucher threat was dismissed by Figlio and Rouse (2006), others have introduced 
school choice as a primary mechanism for improvement (West & Peterson 2006; Hastings & 
Weinstein 2008). In a study investigating Florida schools West and Peterson (2006) find students 
at low-performing schools performed better than their counterparts attending schools not subject 
to accountability threats. The authors found that Blacks, those eligible for Free or Reduced 
Lunch, and those with low initial test scores were most affected. The authors also note that 
targeted sanctions are more effective than general systems. While these results highlight the 
threat of school choice as a mechanism for improvement, others have found that without 
credibility (i.e. availability of school choice options or increased competition) the threat of 
school choice is not sufficient (Hastings & Weinstein 2008; Chakrabarti 2013).  
 The evidence concerning the impact of NCLB and other accountability systems on 
student performance is mixed. While there is no clear evidence suggesting large overall gains in 
student achievement, certain components within the system appear to yield positive results.  The 
strength of accountability systems, or their ability to impose sanctions, is positively correlated 
with student performance. In particular, students at under-performing schools subject to 
sanctions showed the greatest gains. However, it is important to note that not all sanctions yield 
the same results. Simply publishing results does not provide adequate incentive as the greatest 
gains were seen in schools subject to ‘Consequential’ sanctions.  Ahn and Vigdor (2013) 
examine the impact of sanction severity and find similar results. The authors conclude that the 
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strongest positive results are seen with the most severe sanctions, i.e. school restructuring, and 
that gains in sanctioned schools were concentrated among the lowest-performing students.  
 
Data & Methodology – Adequate Yearly Progress 
Data – Adequate Yearly Progress 
 This study uses school-level Needs Improvement reports and Certified Personnel 
Information for school years 2004 to 2011 obtained from the Georgia Department of Education 
(GADOE),  as well as Common Core Data covering the same time period from the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The GADOE data documents the AYP and Needs 
Improvement Status for every Georgia school. AYP status is a coded binary indicator with a 
value equal to one if a school met all requirements and zero otherwise. Needs Improvement 
Status is a categorical variable documenting the level of sanction/intervention present within 
each school. Schools are categorized as Distinguished, Adequate, Adequate – Did Not Meet 
AYP, Needs Improvement – Made AYP, and Needs Improvement. Once a school has been 
designated as “Needs Improvement” they become subject to hierarchical sanctions, which begin 
with school choice and end with school restructuring. 
 This study uses a sample of 2,326 schools from the Needs Improvement Status reports 
provided by the GADOE. Schools were included in the sample based on the availability of 
covariates, and account for 94.5% of all schools within Georgia during this period. The sample is 
an unbalanced panel with approximately seventy-seven percent of schools present in all eight 
years. This leaves twenty-three percent of schools with observed time periods less than eight. 
Covariates were constructed using enrollment data from NCES, as well as AYP reports and 
Certified Personnel Information reports from GADOE. The number of binding subgroups, those 
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populations subject to additional requirements, in both mathematics and ELA is a proxy for the 
amount of AYP pressure each school faces. As the number of subgroups for which a school is 
held accountable increases, so do the opportunities for failure. Using AYP reports, a binding 
subgroup count is obtained by summing the number of groups held accountable in both 
mathematics and English/language arts by year and school. Every subgroup measured under 
NCLB, including the All Student group, is included in the count. Data from NCES is used to 
create school-level demographic and teacher covariates. More specifically, enrollment counts are 
used to determine the percentage of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch and the 
student to teacher ratio. Certified Personnel information is used to categorize teachers by level of 
experience and calculate the percentage of teachers having less than one year’s experience. 
School type is also taken from NCES data as the impact of accountability pressure may vary by 
grades served
6
. Lastly, a binary variable indicating whether or not a school was subject to 
sanctions in the previous year is created. Within a given year all schools categorized as “Needs 
Improvement” or “Needs Improvement – Made AYP” are subject to sanctions. Therefore, the 
lagged value for Needs Improvement status is an indicator of whether or not a school faced 
sanctions in the previous year. As this is a binary variable, the value “1” indicates sanctions were 
imposed. 
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables generated.  Approximately 
80% of schools across all years met Adequate Yearly Progress, implying a failure rate of twenty 
percent. Sixteen percent of schools faced sanction pressure due to repeated failures in previous 
years. Table 4 compares sample averages by school type. 
                                                 
6
 NCES defines institution level based on both lowest and highest grade served. Primary schools are defined as 
having a lowest grade range of Prekindergarten through 3
rd
 grade; highest grade up to 8
th
. Middle schools have a 
lowest grade served between 4
th
 and 7
th
; highest grade between 4
th
 and 9
th
. The lowest grade served in high schools 
ranges between 7
th
 and 12
th
; highest grade of 12
th
. All other possibilities are categorized as “Other” 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Adequate Yearly Progress Measures         
Variables Mean St. Dev Min Max Count 
AYP Status 0.8031 0.3977 0 1 16379 
# of Binding Subgroups 8.0471 2.3126 2 18 16379 
Sanctions 0.1654 0.3715 0 1 16379 
% FRL 0.5682 0.2468 1 1 16379 
Pupil / Teacher Ratio 15.1656 2.3709 1 88 16379 
% of Teachers with Experience less than 
1 year 
0.0534 0.0599 0 1 16379 
 
Table 4. Sample Means of Adequate Yearly Progress Measures by School Type 
Variable All Primary Middle High Other 
AYP Status 0.8031 0.9193 0.7064 0.5311 0.4750 
# of Binding Subgroups 8.0471 7.8539 9.4685 6.8856 8.3375 
Sanctions 0.1654 0.0611 0.3242 0.3186 0.4250 
% FRL 0.5682 0.5914 0.5709 0.4772 0.6383 
Pupil / Teacher Ratio 15.1656 14.8622 15.0653 16.4768 13.5188 
% of Teachers with Experience less 
than 1 year 
0.0534 0.0495 0.0597 0.0584 0.0666 
Number of Observations 16379 9888 3569 2762 160 
 
When comparing AYP passage rates and sanctions pressure the need to control for school 
type becomes apparent. For instance, 91.9% of primary schools pass AYP while only 53.1% of 
high schools met the requirements. Since primary schools are more likely to pass AYP they are 
also less likely to face sanction pressure due to previous years’ failures. Approximately 31.8% of 
high schools within the sample faced sanction pressure as compared to 6.1% of primary schools. 
The average number of binding subgroup requirements equaled approximately eight for 
all schools, and did not vary significantly across school type. The lack of variation in binding 
group requirements suggests that there are other mechanisms working to create the large 
differences between passage rates across school types. One possibility is the lack of student 
preparation becomes more pronounced as a student ages and reaches later grades. Another is the 
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use of graduation rate as a secondary indicator for high schools, while elementary and middle 
schools are allowed to use measures such as attendance or scores on standardized tests in non-
high stakes subjects. Chakrabarti (2013) finds that within threatened schools attendance rates 
improve, with little to no evidence of improvements for graduation rates.  
Methodology – Correlated Random Effects Probit 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the impact of NCLB components on passage 
rates while controlling for other student demographics and school resources. As mentioned 
previously, three measures are used in AYP determinations: test participation, academic 
performance, and a second indicator specific to school type. It is important to note that while the 
formal calculation of AYP status is based solely on these three factors, allowances within each 
make the process more complex. For instance, when measuring academic performance each 
school is allowed to meet AMOs through absolute measurement, confidence intervals, multi-year 
averaging, or the safe harbor method. The final determination combines all three measures to 
form a single binary pass/fail indicator. Therefore, the structure of the dependent variable 
requires the use of a binary response model.  
Accountability components, or structures present within an accountability system, can 
indirectly affect a school’s ability to meet AYP. The two main components of interest for this 
dissertation are the number of binding subgroups and the implementation of sanctions. The 
number of binding subgroups refers to the number of groups for which a school is held 
independently responsible. Having a large number of binding subgroups may increase the 
probability of failure due to the resulting increase in the number of criteria required to meet 
AYP. Imposing sanctions can create pressure that subsequently impacts academic performance 
and secondary indicators such as attendance and graduation rates. One way to address these 
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issues is to use regression analysis to compare schools facing varying accountability components 
while controlling for other school demographics and teacher characteristics. The subsequent 
estimates yield measures of the relative importance of school characteristics in determining 
AYP. The estimates highlight factors that contribute to determining AYP in practice but that are 
unaccounted for in the formal AYP calculation. The formal rules of determination as described 
do not account for the variation in requirements faced by schools due to dissimilar demographics 
and past performance.  
We start with a simple static specification that models AYP status as a function of the 
factors mentioned above. We employ the Chamberlain-Mundlak random effects probit model 
using maximum likelihood estimation. The first specification focuses on the number of binding 
subgroups, while the second adds an additional measure of accountability pressure. More 
specifically, this second measure indicates whether a school faced sanctions in the previous year. 
To address the possibility of state dependence, the previous specifications are also explored 
using a dynamic framework.  
When using panel data two common approaches to estimating binary response models are 
fixed effects and random effects.  One benefit of the fixed effects model is that it assumes no 
relationship between unobserved heterogeneity and model covariates. However, this benefit also 
causes restrictions in the covariates and data available for use. Time invariant covariates are 
eliminated from the model, and observations with no variation in outcome are eliminated from 
the sample. Restricting the estimation sample and excluding critical time invariant variables such 
as school type is not desired. As shown in Table 4, the passage rates for primary, middle, and 
high schools differ greatly. Therefore, the use of the random effects model is explored. The 
random effects model assumes complete independence between unobserved heterogeneity and 
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covariates, thus allowing for the estimation of time constant variables. However, the complete 
independence assumption is not applicable in many cases, creating the need for adjustments. The 
Chamberlain-Mundlak model provides such an adjustment by specifying the precise relationship 
between unobserved heterogeneity and covariates.  
We begin with a general latent variable model,  
                                                    
                                                                     (2)    
    {
         
    
         
    
 
The model stipulates that there is an unobserved continuous variable,    
 , that determines AYP 
status. In the case of accountability systems, the latent variable can be thought of as the sum of 
production with regards to student performance. We do not observe    
 , only the end result of 
passage or failure. The latent variable is modeled as a function of the number of binding 
subgroup requirements (   ), a vector of time-varying covariates (   ), the time constant variable 
of school type (  ), unobserved heterogeneity (  ), and an error term (   ). The outcome actually 
observed is denoted by    .  
The number of binding subgroups represents the number of additional requirements faced 
by each school. This requirement was added to NCLB to ensure that all students were considered 
when calculating accountability performance. An unintended consequence of this calculation 
method is the disproportional amount of accountability pressure placed on heterogeneous schools 
- the more diverse the student population, the greater the number of subgroups for which a 
school can be held accountable. We hypothesize that as the number of binding subgroups 
increases, the more difficult it becomes for a school to meet AYP. This implies a negative 
relationship between the dependent variable and the number of subgroup requirements. Time-
varying covariates include the percentage of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch 
   
29 
 
 
within the school as a whole, the student to teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less 
than one year’s experience7. The percentage of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch is 
a school-level measure of income, and the student to teacher ratio is used as a measure of school 
resources. The percentage of teachers with experience less than one year is yet another proxy for 
school resources. While the literature shows that teacher effectiveness improves with experience, 
Hanushek et al. (2005) suggests that experience is relevant in the first year only. Others 
(Grissmer et al. 2000; Gordon, Kane, and Staiger 2006) find similar results, with gains in 
experience concentrated in the first and second year. The format of Certified Personnel 
Information allows us to identify those teachers within a school with less than one year’s 
experience. The next available experience grouping contains teachers with one to ten years of 
experience, which does not allow for the identification of a teacher’s early years. As the level of 
resources available is a key determinant of the ability of schools to meet state-mandated criteria, 
it is important to account for these resources. Schools lacking sufficient resources may lack the 
capacity to respond to the incentives created under accountability.  
 The second specification adds a measure indicating if a school faced sanctions in the 
previous year which is represented by     . 
                         
                                                                             (3) 
As mentioned earlier, two consecutive years of failing AYP subjects a school to sanctions. The 
intensity of these sanctions increases with each subsequent failure. This variable is intended to 
measure the efficacy of sanctions imposed, with a positive relationship suggesting that sanctions 
lead to improvement in performance as defined by probability of passing AYP. However, it is 
                                                 
7
 All models also contain controls for year effects. 
 
   
30 
 
 
also possible that the enforcement of sanctions on an already failing school could have a negative 
impact on school performance.  
Employing the Chamberlain-Mundlak model relaxes the assumption of complete 
independence between unobserved heterogeneity and covariates. It assumes a specific a 
relationship between the individual effects and covariates. To begin, we define              } 
which represents a vector of accountability components (ACit) and a vector of time-varying 
covariates (xit). The structure of the accountability vector is dependent upon specification. In the 
first specification it contains only the number of binding subgroups, but in the second it also 
contains the sanction status of the previous year. Due to the unbalanced nature of the panel, we 
must also define a selection indicator for each school across periods,                (Wooldridge 
2010). This indicator is equal to one if the observation can be used within estimation, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore the number of periods available for each observation is defined as    
 ∑    
 
    (Wooldridge 2010).  Equation (4) depicts the relationship between the individual effect 
and observable covariates as stated by the model.  
                                                      ̅                                                             (4) 
The individual effect is modeled as a linear function of time averages for all time-varying 
covariates ( ̅ ) and a random error term (  ). The time-average for covariates is defined as 
 ̅     
   ∑    
 
       (Wooldridge 2010). Since this is an unbalanced panel, this vector also 
includes time averages for year dummies as not all observations are present across all years. If 
the relationship in Equation 4 is correctly specified, time-averages account for unobserved 
heterogeneity and consistent estimates are obtained. The final static specifications then become 
                                                              ̅                                            (5) 
                                                             ̅                                    (6) 
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The question of whether or not passage in the current year is influenced by passage in 
previous year introduces the issue of state dependence. AYP status may be an accumulation of 
previous years’ performances as failing in a previous year could negatively or positively impact 
current year’s performance. For instance, the negative stigma that comes with failing AYP for a 
given year could make it more difficult for schools to attract quality teachers or encourage higher 
performing students to seek education elsewhere. However, it is also possible that the 
consequences of school failure serve to correct ineffective policies/structures and promote 
growth in performance. The issue of state dependence is addressed by including the first lag of 
the dependent variable into both specifications. It is important to note that the first lag is a 
different measure from the sanction variable. The sanction variable measures whether or not a 
school was subject to sanctions in the previous year, and sanction status is dependent upon two 
consecutive years of performance. The first lag is an indicator of the previous year’s 
performance only. There are two categories within the Needs Improvement status that highlight 
these differences. Any school classified in the “Needs Improvement – Made AYP” category 
made AYP in the current year but is still subject to sanctions as it takes two consecutive years of  
passing AYP to exit Needs Improvement status. Also, schools in their first year of failure are 
classified as “Adequate – Did Not Meet” and are not subject to sanctions due to the reliance on 
two consecutive years of performance. Therefore whether or not a school is subject to sanctions 
in the previous year and the first lag of the dependent variable bring different information to the 
model.  
 In order to obtain consistent estimates using a dynamic model, the initial conditions 
problem must be addressed.  If left ignored, the model assumes the start of the student 
performance process begins with the first observation. And while there are new entrants into the 
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panel during the period investigated it is unreasonable to assume that all other schools start the 
achievement process with the initial observation. Therefore, we need to account for the 
possibility of endogeneity within initial conditions. The method used by Wooldridge (2005) 
suggests including the initial condition (yi0) in the definition of the individual effect  
                                                                      ̅                                                      (7) 
The unbalanced nature of the panel requires the allowance of heterogeneous initial conditions as 
each school did not enter the panel during the same time period. The final specifications for the 
dynamic model are thus, 
                                                                          ̅                    (8) 
                                                           ̅          (9) 
All models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Average marginal effects are calculated 
and displayed in the results section of this chapter.  
 
Results – Adequate Yearly Progress 
Correlated Random Effects – Average Partial Effects 
This section presents the results found when examining the relationship between 
accountability structures and passage rates. We estimate both the static and dynamic correlated 
random effects (CRE) probit models as outlined previously
8
. Note that coefficients obtained 
from a probit model are limited in their interpretation. The direction of the relationship between 
covariate and dependent variable is determined by the sign, but the magnitude of the coefficient 
is in terms of the standard deviation of the latent variable. The expected change in the 
conditional mean of the outcome given changes in covariates is not directly estimated. Therefore, 
                                                 
8
 Fixed effects estimates were performed for comparison and are available upon request. 
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other than direction, the coefficients do not lend themselves to meaningful interpretation. It is for 
this reason that marginal effects are estimated for every binary response model presented. 
Marginal effects are generally estimated in two ways – the marginal effect at the mean or the 
mean marginal effect. The marginal effect at the mean gives the marginal effect for a particular 
covariate when all other covariates are held at their mean value,  ̅. Average marginal effects or 
average partial effects (APEs) yield the population averaged marginal effect. The marginal effect 
is calculated for each case, and then these effects are averaged over the entire population. APEs 
encompass all covariate values and lend themselves to more general interpretations. However, in 
order for APEs to be consistent, the distribution of the covariates must be representative of the 
population. For this study, we choose to estimate the APE as it incorporates the population as a 
whole as opposed to focusing on a single and possibly non-representative covariate value. 
The first model specifies AYP passage as a static function of binding subgroup 
requirements, proxies for student income and school resources, and school type. Table 5 shows a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between binding subgroup requirements and 
passage rates. As the number of binding subgroups increases, the probability of AYP passage 
decreases. An increase in subgroup requirements increases the number of accountability 
standards that must be met, increasing the opportunities for failure. Therefore, heterogeneous 
schools may have a more difficult time passing AYP as they face more binding requirements and 
consequently more accountability criteria. The subgroup requirements were put in place to 
ensure improvement for all students, but the structure of the system may actually increase the 
likelihood of failure. A single unit increase in the number of binding subgroups decreases the 
probability of a school meeting AYP by approximately 5.6 percentage points.  While the 
coefficient does not appear extremely large in magnitude, it is important to remember that an 
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increase in a specific subgroup population could add up to two additional binding requirements 
as math and ELA are counted separately. Therefore, growth in one subgroup population could 
lead to a decrease in the probability of passing AYP that is greater than 5.6 percentage points. 
The results found here are aligned with literature (Sims 2013; Kane & Staiger 2003) that 
suggests the imposition of additional subgroup requirements increases the probability of school 
failure.  
All covariates controlling for student income and school resources have the expected 
sign, but not all are significant. Both proxies for school resources are negative and significant, 
but the impact of the percentage of students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch is negative and 
insignificant. An increase in the percentage of teachers with less than one year of experience 
creates a large decrease in probability of passing AYP. The negative nature of this relationship is 
consistent with the literature, but the magnitude of the effect appears to be relatively large. One 
possible explanation focuses on measures of school quality. The level of resources or the ability 
of a school to attract experienced teachers can be considered a function of school quality. Those 
schools with a greater percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience may be 
classified as low quality or under-performing. Therefore, this percentage not only acts as a proxy 
for school resources, but may encompass other factors associated with underperforming or low 
quality schools leading to an amplified effect.  
The second specification introduces a binary covariate indicating whether a school faced 
sanctions in the previous year. Similar to the results found in the literature, sanctions have a 
positive impact on performance. Schools facing sanctions in the previous year were 5.3 
percentage points more likely to meet AYP. The size of the effect implies that incentives 
generated by the sanction system are positive and moderate in magnitude. Being subject to 
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sanctions in a previous year can improve student performance through the creation of greater 
incentives or the implementation of structural changes. When examining the moderate magnitude 
of the sanctions effect, it is important to note the tiered nature of Georgia’s system and the 
implication of these tiers on sanction severity. Although two consecutive years of AYP failure 
places a school in the Needs Improvement status, it takes three to four consecutive failures for a 
school to face corrective sanctions. Prior to corrective action sanctions are limited to school 
choice and mandatory tutor offerings.  
In the second specification, both the magnitude and sign of the binding subgroup 
requirement remain unchanged. In fact, the sign and significance of all covariates except the for 
Free or Reduced Lunch variable remain the same. The effect of the percentage of students 
receiving Free or Reduced Lunch remains negative but both the magnitude and significance 
differs from the first specification. The first specification depicted an insignificant negative APE 
ranging from 6.8 to 8.2 percentage points, while the second specification shows a significant but 
still negative APE of 11.9 percentage points.  
The dynamic model is estimated to allow for state dependence. High levels of state 
dependence suggest the probability of passing AYP is persistent over time, and mobility from 
state to state is limited.  As can be seen in Table 5 the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable in the first specification is positive and significant.  Passing in a previous year increases 
the probability of passing in current year by 8.6 percentage points. However, the magnitude of 
the coefficient implies that the current AYP state is not highly dependent upon the previous 
year’s performance. The initial condition in Specification (1) is also positive, significant, and 
relatively small in magnitude. These findings, in combination with positive impact of sanctions, 
support the idea of mobility between states. Between the years of 2005 and 2011, only five to ten 
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percent of schools failed to reach standards for three consecutive years and faced school choice. 
When examining school restructuring the percentage range decreases further, with merely four to 
six percent of schools facing this most extreme sanction.  
Facing sanctions in the previous year increases the probability of passing AYP by 7 
percentage points in the dynamic model, compared to the 5.3 percentage point increase found in 
in the static model. Both effects are moderate in magnitude and in line with the positive impact 
of sanctions. The effect of the previous year’s performance remains positive in the dynamic 
model. Schools who met the standard in the previous year were 9.2 percentage points more likely 
to meet the standard. The initial condition coefficient remains positive but becomes insignificant 
and is greatly reduced in magnitude. When moving to the dynamic model, the impact of binding 
subgroup requirements remains moderate and negative in sign; the effect of sanctions remains 
positive. It is important to note that the magnitude of the change in the sanctions coefficient was 
significant as the coefficient increased from 5.3 percentage points to 7 percentage points, an 
increase of approximately 32%. These results suggest that while the impact of sanctions on 
passage rates is influenced by state dependence, the impact of subgroup requirements is not.  
The magnitude and significance of all other covariates remained relatively unchanged. 
However, it is important to note that rho, a measure of individual heterogeneity, decreased 
greatly when moving from the static to dynamic model. The decline in rho suggests that 
accounting the previous year’s state accounts for a significant portion of individual 
heterogeneity. As a robustness check, estimates using pooled maximum likelihood methods are 
available in Appendix D 
9
. 
 
                                                 
9
 When estimating the correlated random effects probit model with pooled maximum likelihood methods, clustering 
on the individual school ID is necessary.  
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Correlated Random Effects – Distribution of the Covariates 
Next, we estimate the marginal effect at specified values of two covariates: the 
percentage of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch and the percentage of teachers with 
less than one year’s experience. More specifically, we examine the marginal effect at the 25th, 
50
th
, 75
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles of these covariates to determine if marginal effects differ 
dependent upon location within each covariate distribution. In the static model of Specification 
(2), schools with a high proportion of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch experience 
greater negative marginal effects from the subgroup requirements. Moving from the 25
th
 to the 
90
th
 percentile in the distribution of percentage of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch 
causes the marginal effect to increase by 12 percentage points or 25 percent. Examining the 
distribution of inexperienced teachers yields similar results. The marginal effect increases 
approximately 6 percentage points or 12 percent from the 25
th
 to the 90
th
 percentile, highlighting 
that those schools with the most inexperienced teachers are the most negatively affected. 
However, results also indicate that applying sanctions is most effective for those schools with a 
large proportion of economically disadvantaged students and a relatively high percentage of 
inexperienced teachers. These results suggest that sanction interventions were most helpful in 
schools with low values for school income and school resource proxies. When transitioning to 
the dynamic model, there is a uniform decrease in the magnitude of the marginal effect of 
subgroup requirements. The approximate 30% increase in the marginal effect of sanctions seen 
in both covariate distributions, reinforces the importance of accounting for state dependence 
within the model.  
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Table 6. Average Partial Effects of Accountability Measures at Specified Values of Covariates 
 
Static  Dynamic  
Variables 
Binding 
Requirements Sanctions 
Binding 
Requirements Sanctions 
% of FRL Students 
    25th Percentile -0.049*** 0.048*** -0.047*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
50th Percentile -0.053*** 0.052*** -0.051*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
75th Percentile -0.058*** 0.057*** -0.055*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
90th Percentile -0.061*** 0.060*** -0.058*** 0.079*** 
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
% of Teachers with Exp < 1 
    25th Percentile -0.051*** 0.050*** -0.049*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
50th Percentile -0.053*** 0.052*** -0.051*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
75th Percentile -0.055*** 0.054*** -0.052*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
90th Percentile -0.057*** 0.056*** -0.054*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
     N 16379 16379 16379 16379 
Note: All specifications include time dummies; Clustered standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Mundlak-Chamberlain equation includes time averages of all time-
varying variables including time dummies. Dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a school meets 
AYP and zero otherwise.  
 
 
Correlated Random Effects – Stratified by School Type 
AYP results published yearly by the GADOE suggest that high schools are less likely to 
pass AYP than other school types. In 2011, 72% of all schools met the requirements. However, 
when broken down by school type primary schools had a passage rate of 83%, approximately 
70% of middle schools made AYP, and only 41% of high schools met the standard. In the results 
presented in Table 5 high schools are the omitted category, and as evident from the estimates 
both middle and primary schools were more likely to pass AYP. When compared to high 
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schools, middle schools were 19.5 to 29.9 percentage points more likely to pass and primary 
schools were 27.3 to 49.5 percentage points more likely meet AYP.  
We examine potential differences and test the robustness of previous findings through 
analyzing subsets of the data stratified by school type. Stratifying by school type allows for 
distinct slopes on all estimated variables, while previous estimates allowed for differing 
intercepts only. When examining schools across types, patterns similar to the full sample emerge. 
Sanctions have a relatively small positive and significant impact on AYP status, increases in 
binding subgroups have a negative impact, and there is evidence to suggest past performance has 
an effect on current passage rates. The magnitudes of the effects vary by school type, with 
primary schools showing the least response to accountability measures. However the differences 
in magnitude observed across all covariates are not large enough to generate the dissimilarities in 
passage rates seen by school type. Therefore, the mechanisms examined do not appear to 
generate the differences in passage rates between elementary, middle, and high schools. 
Dissimilarities by school type in the nature of the AYP second indicator as well as flexibility of 
curriculum delivery and content may account for the differences observed in passage rates. As 
stated previously high schools are subject to a different secondary indicator than primary and 
middle schools. While middle and primary schools are allowed to use attendance and 
performance on student assessments as a secondary indicator, high schools must use graduation 
rates. Passage of the secondary indicator is mandatory for meeting AYP, therefore difficulty in 
maintaining the mandated graduation rate may put high schools at a disadvantage. The structured 
nature of high school may also contribute to the increased probability of failure. Teachers in both 
primary and middle schools have more freedom to adjust curriculum and content to focus on 
test-specific skills and subjects. 
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Table 7. Average Partial Effect by School Type, Chamberlain-Mundlak Model, 2004-2011 
  Static Dynamic 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Variables: 
Average 
Partial Effect 
Average 
Partial Effect 
Average 
Partial Effect 
Average 
Partial Effect 
High Schools 
    
Lagged Value of AYP Status 
  
0.107*** 0.119*** 
   
(0.029) (0.027) 
Initial Condition for AYP Status 
  
0.053* 0.016 
   
(0.031) (0.023) 
Sanctions 
 
0.085*** 
 
0.117*** 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.017) 
# of Binding Subgroups -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.052*** -0.045*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
% of FRL Students -0.511** -0.560** -0.479** -0.549*** 
 
(0.242) (0.233) (0.201) (0.189) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio (Nearest Integer) 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
% of Teachers w. Experience < 1 year -0.027 0.015 -0.059 -0.006 
 
(0.248) (0.218) (0.234) (0.242) 
     N 2762 2762 2762 2762 
Middle Schools 
    
Lagged Value of AYP Status 
  
0.065*** 0.083*** 
   
(0.020) (0.019) 
Initial Condition for AYP Status 
  
0.091*** 0.020 
   
(0.023) (0.020) 
Sanctions 
 
0.136*** 
 
0.152*** 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
# of Binding Subgroups -0.092*** -0.086*** -0.089*** -0.083*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) 
% of FRL Students -0.242 -0.337** -0.238 -0.342** 
 
(0.197) (0.169) (0.168) (0.162) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio (Nearest Integer) -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% of Teachers w. Experience < 1 year -0.415*** -0.415*** -0.434*** -0.432*** 
 
(0.136) (0.132) (0.129) (0.136) 
     N 3569 3569 3569 3569 
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Primary Schools 
Lagged Value of AYP Status 
  
0.030*** 0.038*** 
   
(0.011) (0.014) 
Initial Condition for AYP Status 
  
0.027*** -0.008 
   
(0.009) (0.008) 
Sanctions 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.054*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
# of Binding Subgroups -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
     % of FRL Students 0.086* 0.080 0.087 0.083 
 
(0.050) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio (Nearest Integer) -0.004** -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
% of Teachers w. Experience < 1 year -0.146*** -0.161*** -0.141*** -0.156*** 
 
(0.050) (0.047) (0.054) (0.048) 
     N 9888 9888 9888 9888 
Note: All specifications include time dummies; Clustered standard errors are in parentheses; *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Mundlak-Chamberlain equation includes 
time averages of all time-varying variables including time dummies. Dependent variable is a binary 
indicator equal to one if a school meets AYP and zero otherwise 
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Chapter IV 
THE IMPACT OF ACCOUNTABILITY ON SUBGROUP PERFORMANCE  
 
Motivation for Research 
The level of Annual Measureable Objectives (AMOs) set under NCLB highlights the 
need for separate requirements for subgroup populations. During no point from 2003-2011 was 
one-hundred percent proficiency required for every student category. This was not to happen 
until the 2013-2014 school year. Once the system required 100% proficiency for all students, the 
need for separate subgroup requirements would have become unnecessary. However, the 2011 
AMOs allow 24.3% of all students to fall below proficiency in elementary and middle school 
math; 20% of all elementary and middle school students to fall below proficiency in English and 
language arts; approximately 24% of all high school students to score below the math standard; 
and 11.2% all of students to score below proficiency in high school English and language arts
10
. 
These figures highlight a pattern present in all years of NCLB, the percentage of students 
allowed to fail the CRCT Math examination is higher than any other category. Therefore the 
largest margin for underperformance or lack of attention occurs within elementary and middle 
school math.  For schools in which disadvantaged subgroups constitute a small proportion of the 
population, allowing a failure rate of 24.3% excuses these schools from concentrating on 
subgroup performance - given that a sufficient amount of the total population scores at 
proficiency.  
                                                 
10
 2011 AMOs: CRCT Math – 75.7%; CRCT ELA – 80%; GHSGT Math – 76%; GHSGT ELA – 90.8% 
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The negative results of the binding requirements found in the previous chapter motivate 
the examination of the impact of these requirements within subgroup themselves as opposed to 
the school as a whole. In other words, the second question of this dissertation examines the 
impact of accountability systems on the performance of particular subgroups within the student 
population. Findings from Chapter III suggest that an increase in the number of requirements has 
a negative impact on passage rates - a finding which holds across school types. These results 
raise the question of the mechanism through which an increase in the number of subgroup 
requirements generates an increase in probability of school failure. For instance, is the increase 
in the probability of failure simply due to an increase in the number of accountability criteria that 
must be met? Or does a lack of improvement in the performance of binding subgroups produce 
increased probability of school failure? The intent of this chapter is not only to examine the 
impact of binding requirements on subgroup performance, but also to determine if the effects 
vary dependent upon a subgroup’s position in the performance distribution.  
The remainder of this chapter describes the subgroup requirements in Georgia, provides a 
literature review of the differential impact of accountability systems on varying student 
populations, introduces the data and methodology used to investigate the questions proposed, and 
lastly presents the results found.  
 
History of Subgroup Requirements in Georgia 
Whether or not a particular subgroup enters into a school’s accountability profile is 
dependent upon the size of the overall student population as well as the size of the subgroup 
itself. As such not every school is held accountable for every subgroup. Again, the designated 
subgroups for the state of Georgia are as follows: All Student subgroup, Asian/Pacific Islander, 
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American Indian/Alaskan, Blacks, Hispanics, whites, multi-racial, students with disabilities 
(SWD), limited English proficiency (LEP), and the economically disadvantaged (ED)
11
.  
Table 8 details the percentage of schools subject to a particular subgroup requirement in 
both mathematics and English/language arts
12
. It is important to note that the populations of 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 are limited to those schools with at least one subgroup requirement other than 
the “All Student” group. Due to data restrictions they are also limited to those schools serving 
grades in which the CRCT and GHSGT are administered
13
. While the percentage of schools 
individually responsible for the Asian subgroup remains relatively small throughout the course of 
this study, the vast majority of schools were responsible for the economically disadvantaged. The 
percentage peaked at 93% during both the 2010 and 2011 school years. Approximately 70% of 
schools each year were accountable for the Black subgroup, while the percentage of schools 
responsible for the white subgroup decreased from 75% in 2004 to 70% in 2011. Hispanics were 
the only subgroup to see significant growth in binding requirements during the period, and 
students with disabilities were the only group to see a dramatic decline. The source of these 
trends is uncertain as they could reflect changes in the population or classification shifts. For 
example, during the period studied Georgia’s Hispanic population grew which most likely 
accounts for the increase in the number of schools held accountable for this particular subgroup. 
However, population shift may not be the most suitable explanation for the decrease seen within 
the SWD subgroup. Difficulty in meeting performance standards may have led to fewer students 
being identified and tested within this group, ultimately causing the decrease in the percentage of 
schools held accountable for SWD.  
                                                 
11
 The American Indian/Alaskan and multi-racial subgroups are excluded from all analysis in this chapter due to the 
limited instances of enrollment reaching the binding threshold.   
12
 Note that it is possible for schools to be held accountable for a subgroup in one subject area but not the other.  
13
 Detailed subgroup assessment performance data is only available for the CRCT and GHSGT.  
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Table 8. Percentage of Schools facing Binding Requirements in both Math and ELA, 2004-2011 
Year 
# of 
Schools 
Asian/ 
Pacific 
Islander 
Blacks Hispanics Whites SWD LEP ED 
2004 2002 5.29% 72.18% 14.49% 75.87% 46.80% 6.59% 88.71% 
2005 2029 3.30% 71.07% 12.67% 73.93% 40.17% 5.27% 88.37% 
2006 2058 3.69% 70.94% 13.99% 72.98% 39.65% 6.37% 89.36% 
2007 2095 3.91% 71.17% 15.99% 71.89% 37.09% 6.21% 90.69% 
2008 2133 4.13% 71.26% 16.88% 71.21% 32.96% 6.70% 91.42% 
2009 2160 4.58% 71.62% 17.87% 70.32% 28.15% 7.64% 91.71% 
2010 2214 4.52% 71.59% 21.59% 71.14% 27.37% 9.35% 93.41% 
2011 2239 5.09% 70.03% 22.20% 70.12% 27.24% 9.74% 92.99% 
NOTE: Compiled using Georgia Department of Education, Adequate Yearly Progress Reports, 2004-2011; Multi-
Racial subgroup excluded from table above as less than one percent of schools are bound by this requirement.  
 
While Table 8 gives detail concerning the number of schools bound by subgroup 
requirements, Table 9 shows how these schools and subgroups performed. More specifically, it 
shows the percentage meeting Annual Measurable Objectives in mathematics and English/ 
language arts for those schools in which the subgroup requirement is binding. All subgroups 
defined by race or ethnicity, except Blacks, maintain a passage rate of over 90 percent 
throughout the panel. The passage rates for Blacks fell to 82% in both the 2010 and 2011 school 
years due to a large decrease in the number of Blacks meeting the math requirement. The three 
subgroups not defined by race or ethnicity have lower passage rates, the lowest occurring within 
the students with disabilities subgroup.  
Of those schools meeting standards in the “All Student” group, a significant percentage 
fail to meet AYP due to inadequate achievement in other subgroup populations. Table 10 gives a 
summary of the impact of subgroup accountability on making AYP for a school as a whole. In 
2004, approximately 14% of schools who met both mathematics and ELA requirements for all 
students collectively did not make AYP due to the failure of a particular subgroup. For these 
schools, the performance of at least one subgroup lagged behind the performance of the student  
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Table 9. Percentage of Subgroups Meeting Annual Measurable Objectives (AMOs), 2004-2011 
Year 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
Blacks Hispanics Whites SWD LEP ED 
2004 100.00% 97.09% 96.55% 100.07% 77.80% 90.15% 95.15% 
2005 100.00% 91.33% 93.77% 100.00% 77.68% 78.50% 93.30% 
2006 100.00% 90.06% 90.28% 99.93% 78.77% 69.47% 90.05% 
2007 100.00% 91.42% 98.21% 99.80% 78.25% 84.62% 92.63% 
2008 100.00% 87.30% 98.06% 99.47% 81.91% 90.21% 89.28% 
2009 100.00% 90.95% 99.22% 99.67% 86.84% 95.73% 92.63% 
2010 98.00% 82.27% 96.85% 99.05% 77.24% 92.23% 85.58% 
2011 95.61% 82.91% 96.77% 99.11% 75.08% 81.19% 85.88% 
NOTE: Compiled using Georgia Department of Education, Adequate Yearly Progress Reports, 2004-2011; Multi-
Racial subgroup excluded from table above as less than one percent of schools are bound by this requirement. 
 
Table 10. Failure of AYP due to Additional Subgroup Requirements, 2004-2011 
Year # of Schools 
# of Schools with 
Additional Subgroup 
Requirements 
# of Schools Passing 
"All Subgroup" 
#% Failing Additional 
Subgroup Requirement 
2004 2002 1978 1953 13.93% 
2005 2029 2004 1948 13.86% 
2006 2058 2033 1917 13.72% 
2007 2095 2063 1970 11.52% 
2008 2133 2102 1950 11.59% 
2009 2160 2121 2011 7.56% 
2010 2214 2173 1936 11.00% 
2011 2239 2193 1969 13.76% 
NOTE: Compiled using Georgia Department of Education, Adequate Yearly Progress Reports, 2004-
2011 
 
population as a whole. The percentage of schools failing solely due subgroup performance 
reached its lowest point in 2009 at 7.56%, but climbed to 13.76% by 2011.  
All previous tables and figures have focused on the performance of binding subgroups in 
relation to the school as a whole. However, in order to perform an analysis on the impact of the 
requirements within each subgroup you must include the entire population – those held 
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accountable and those not held accountable. The following figures show the percentage of all 
students meeting or exceeding the standard within a given year by subgroup, subject and test.  
Blacks, Hispanics, and the economically disadvantaged have similar trend patterns in 
English/language arts. While Blacks and the economically disadvantaged also move in similar 
patterns in mathematics, the Hispanic subgroup outperforms both. During the time period studied 
the statewide curriculum in Georgia transitioned from Quality Core Curriculum (QCC) to 
Georgia Performance Standards (GPS).  The staging of the transition from QCC to GPS differed 
by grade and subject area
14
. In 2006 students taking the CRCT in ELA were assessed using GPS, 
while dependent upon grade level the mathematics CRCT transitioned to GPS from 2006 
through 2008. The 2008 school year also saw a transition away from QCC towards GPS for 
students taking the GHSGT in ELA. The mathematics portion of the GHSGT switched to GPS in 
the 2011 school year. Transition years can be identified in the graphs below by the uniform 
decreases in the percentage of students meeting standard across all subgroups. 
The stipulations of NCLB required that Georgia measure progress as changes in 
aggregate levels of performance and not as improvements in individual student performance. 
Therefore, although SSAS promotes adequate yearly progress, it is a status-based model and not 
a growth approach (Figlio & Ladd 2008). The distinction between the two models is important 
because each creates different incentives. Status-based models provide a uniform target for all 
groups and force schools to focus on low-achieving students that may have otherwise been 
ignored - a primary goal of NCLB and SSAS. However, one disadvantage of status-based models 
is that they do not take into account students’ original levels of achievement or students’ ending 
positions. Whether or not a student meets the proposed standard may be highly dependent on 
where they began. It is because of this that status-based systems may favor schools serving more 
                                                 
14
 A description of the transition from QCC to GPS is available in Appendix C. 
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Figure 4. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject, Subgroup, and Year – CRCT ELA 
 
 
Figure 5. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject, Subgroup, and Year – CRCT Mathematics 
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Figure 6. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject, Subgroup, and Year – GHSGT ELA 
 
 
Figure 7. Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject, Subgroup, and Year – GHSGT Mathematics 
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advantaged students, as there is a high correlation between socio-economic status and student 
achievement (Ladd 2007). More advantaged students begin with higher scores and therefore are 
able to reach and surpass thresholds more easily than their lower socio-economic counterparts. 
The status-based nature of SSAS also creates incentives as to which students receive additional 
attention. Those students scoring just below proficiency receive additional attention, and the 
number of students falling into this category is dependent upon the proficiency threshold.  
Given the nature of SSAS and the incentives generated, the following literature review 
investigates the possibility that accountability systems create differential impacts dependent upon 
student characteristics.  
 
Literature Review – Differential Impact of Accountability Systems 
A large number of studies indicate that accountability has a small positive effect on 
achievement. But there is also evidence to suggest that the impact of accountability does not 
affect all students uniformly. Differences can be seen across ethnicity groups and achievement 
levels. The notion of ‘educational triage’ (Gillborn & Youdell 2000) suggests rationing school 
resources to promote achievement for a targeted group of students. Schools and teachers may 
choose to target only those students whose scores are used in determining overall status, to focus 
on students at a particular point in the achievement distribution, or increase the placement of 
students into categories unaffected by accountability measures.  
Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status 
Two categories included in determining subgroup requirements are ethnic/racial 
categories and socioeconomic status. Many studies have investigated the differential impact of 
accountability on disadvantaged populations, but the evidence is mixed. Carnoy and Loeb (2002) 
   
52 
 
 
find that Blacks and Hispanics are most affected when looking at NAEP results. West and 
Peterson (2006) find similar results while investigating the Florida system. For those schools 
previously receiving a failing grade, Blacks and the economically disadvantaged saw a 
significant improvement in scores while other groups did not. Receiving a grade of ‘D’ appeared 
to have a broader effect as whites, Blacks, and all income groups saw significant improvements. 
Hemelt (2011) and Figlio et al. (2009) also find positive impacts of accountability for minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged. Lauen and Gaddis (2012) found positive results for both 
groups in mathematics, while the results for reading were less consistent. However, others (Kane 
& Staiger 2003; Cronin et. al., 2005; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005) have found accountability to 
have a neutral to negative effect on the achievement of minority populations. Cronin et al. (2005) 
documented that both Blacks and Hispanics experienced lower rates of growth than their white 
counterparts under NCLB. Hanushek and Raymond (2005) find similar negative results for 
Blacks and Hispanics despite a gain in scores for all students as a whole. Not only did Blacks 
experience lower growth rates than their white counterparts, they were also the group least 
impacted by the system. Therefore, although accountability increased overall student 
performance, it contributed to growth in the Black-white achievement gap. Clotfelter, Ladd, and 
Vigor (2009) find mixed results with respect to the influence of accountability measures on 
minority populations. The achievement of Blacks at the bottom of the performance distribution 
increased at the expense of those at the top. 
Distributional Effects 
Focusing on students based on their position within the distribution of achievement 
scores is another common option of educational triage. Reback (2008) used individual student 
level data from Texas to determine the impact of accountability on the distribution of student 
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achievement. He hypothesized that a student will receive more attention in a particular subject if 
that student’s score is on the passing margin, if the school as a whole is underperforming in that 
subject relative to others, or if a significant portion of the student’s class is on the passing 
margin. Findings showed that students on the margin experienced greater than expected 
achievement gains in both math and reading. Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) also find evidence 
that those students closest to the threshold experience the largest gain in scores. Studying 
Chicago public schools, the authors find no evidence that those at the bottom of the distribution 
experienced score gains, and mixed evidence supporting gains for high-achievers. Using data 
from Wisconsin, Chakrabarti (2013) also finds that students at the margin benefit the most from 
accountability pressure. However, improvements made were not obtained at the expense of 
students at the lower end of the distribution. Given the evidence in the literature concerning the 
performance of students on the margin it is important to note that while distributional differences 
in gains can be explained using “educational triage” theory, differences in student effort is yet 
another plausible explanation. Those students on the margin have greater incentive to put forth 
greater effort, while those at both the top and bottom of the distribution have little to no incentive 
to alter their effort level (Betts & Costrell 2001). 
Ballou & Springer (2009), using student-level test score data from seven states, also 
investigate the distributional effects of NCLB. The authors compare test scores across years as 
grades enter the accountability system. Years in which test scores within a grade do not 
contribute to NCLB calculations are classified as low-stake years, and those in which test scores 
are used in calculations are labeled high-stakes years. Findings show that accountability 
increased achievement in high-stakes years, and those at the low end of the distribution benefited 
most at the expense of high-achievers. Reback (2008) suggests that while students at the margin 
   
54 
 
 
benefit most from accountability measures, students at the bottom of the distribution can benefit 
as well. If a higher rating is attainable through a small increase in performance in a given subject 
area, greater amounts of resources are devoted to this subject and low-achieving students may 
experience larger than expected gains. 
North Carolina implemented a growth based accountability system prior to NCLB, and 
with the act’s passage added status-based components in the 2003-2004 school year. Ladd and 
Lauen (2010) use individual student level data to determine how the two reform approaches 
affect students at various points in the performance distribution.  For those students below 
proficiency both systems generate gains in achievement. However, for those students located at 
the top of the distribution, status-based reform caused a decrease in gains. More specifically, 
failing to make AYP or pressure under the status-based system generates gains in math scores for 
the lower end of the distribution but slows growth for those at the top. In reading, test scores at 
the lower end of the distribution increased, but large losses were incurred at the upper end of the 
distribution. Therefore, under the status-based system, low-achieving students improve their test 
scores at the expense of high-achievers.  
In all, the results are mixed when examining the impact of accountability systems on 
subgroup populations. While a branch of the literature show gains in scores (Carnoy & Loeb 
2002; West & Peterson 2006), others note the relative magnitude of these gains maintain the 
achievement gap between minority populations and their white counterparts (Cronin et al. 2005; 
Hanushek & Raymond 2005). The results concerning the distributional impact are also mixed. 
Several studies find those at the margin, or close to the passing value, show the greatest 
improvement (Reback 2008; Neal and Schanzenbach 2010). While others claim low-achievers 
   
55 
 
 
are the beneficiaries at the expense of high-achieving students (Ballou & Springer 2009; Ladd 
and Lauen 2010).  
 
Data & Methodology – Binding Subgroup Requirements 
Data – Binding Subgroup Requirements 
 The data used are detailed school-level Adequate Yearly Progress Reports ranging from 
the 2004 school year through the 2011 school year. The reports give the percentage meeting, 
exceeding, and failing the standard for every subgroup and assessment (CRCT and GHSGT 
exams) within a school for a given year. The data most critical to this chapter are the various 
counts of Full Academic Year (FAY) students, represented in the AYP reports through the 
following variables: Students in AYP grade levels, First Time Test Takers, enrollment during 
testing window, and test participants. Calculation of the binding enrollment cutoff and a school’s 
position relative to this cutoff are performed given this information. Whether or not a school is 
held independently responsible for a particular subgroup is dependent upon on these calculations. 
Certified Personnel Information (CPI) and Common Core data are mined to create covariates for 
model robustness checks. The covariates included are estimated at the school-level. Estimates are 
performed by subgroup, but this does not create an issue as school and subgroup levels are 
equivalent. The only deviation occurs when a school administers both the CRCT and GHSGT, 
which occurs in less than two percent of the population. Covariates used include the percentage 
of all students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch, the pupil to teacher ratio, the percentage of 
teachers with less than one year’s experience, and school type. It is important to note that these 
covariates apply to the student population as a whole, while the subgroup measures apply to 
students within AYP tested grades only.  
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Methodology - Regression Discontinuity & Quantile Estimation 
While it is possible to evaluate students at the individual level to determine the impact of 
an accountability system, the structure of a status-based system creates incentives for the entire 
school. Jacob (2002) finds that response to accountability occurs at the school-level as opposed 
to the student level. Prior school achievement had a greater impact on outcomes than prior 
student scores. Combining this result with the presence of indivisibilities in production within 
schools, the need for school-level analysis becomes apparent.   
Following the methodology originally proposed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), 
and further defined by various authors (Hahn et al. 2001; Lee 2008; van der Klaauw 2002 and 
2008) this chapter uses a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to identify the impact of 
subgroup requirements on achievement. By focusing on schools with subgroup populations close 
to the requirement threshold the impact of this accountability policy can be determined (van der 
Klaauw 2008). Evaluation begins with the acknowledgment of two potential outcomes Yi(0) and 
Yi(1), where Yi(0) represents the outcome for untreated schools/subgroups and Yi(1) represents 
the outcome of those treated. The outcome of interest in this study is the percentage of students 
within a subgroup who meet or exceed the proficiency standard in a given school year. The 
causal effect is identified as Yi(1) – Yi(0). However since we cannot observe both Yi(0) and 
Yi(1) simultaneously, the observed outcome is defined as follows: 
                                        Yi=(1-wi)*Yi(0) + wi*Yi(0) ,                                                  (10) 
 
where wi is an indicator equal to one if treatment is received and equal to zero otherwise.  
The keystone of RDD is that assignment to treatment is determined by the value of a predictor 
also known as a forcing or running variable, Xi. The forcing variable in this study is the number 
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of Full Academic Year students tested within a subgroup population
15
. In order to determine if a 
subgroup will be included separately in AYP determinations the Georgia Department of 
Education (DOE) evaluates the following equation:  
max (.10*Students in AYP Grade Levels, 40), with a cap set at 75 students.               (11) 
Threshold values are dependent upon school size. More specifically, they are dependent upon the 
number of Full Academic Year students present within tested grades or AYP grade levels. This 
relationship is outlined below in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Binding Requirement Thresholds 
Students in AYP Grade Levels   Threshold Value 
FAY Students ≤ 400 
 
40 
   
400 > FAY Students > 750 
 
41 - 75 
   
FAY Students ≥ 750   75 
NOTE: Generated using the Binding Requirement Rule as described in Equation (11) 
 
A school becomes accountable for a subgroup if one of the two following conditions holds:  
1.) Subgroup population consists of 10% of all students in AYP grade levels and    
is a minimum of 40 students  
 
2.) Subgroup population >= 75  
 
Since classification as treatment or control is completely determined through the forcing 
variable, sharp RDD is most applicable in this case. All schools with values of the forcing 
variable exceeding one of the stipulated cutoffs are located within the treatment group, and all 
schools with values below the cutoff point are classified as untreated.  
                                                 
15
 As the ability to exclude students is limited the number of students tested is highly correlated with the subgroup 
population as a whole. It is also important to note that Georgia makes distinctions between all students and those 
enrolled for a Full Academic Year (FAY). Only FAY students are used in making AYP determinations.  
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It is important to emphasize that for the purpose of this study a subgroup is considered to 
be ‘treated’ if their performance directly impacts the overall AYP determination. Therefore, 
‘treatment’ consists of a school being held independently accountable for the performance of a 
given subgroup population. This is of course in addition to being held responsible for the 
performance of the school as a whole. The following thought experiment explains the nature of 
the ‘treatment’ group: Consider the additional responsibility imposed due to binding 
requirements as enrollment in a separate program promoting and requiring higher achievement 
for each bounded subgroup. Treatment is then defined as enrollment into a program we label 
SPARE
16
. Within SPARE, every school is held accountable for the performance of each of their 
bounded subgroups.  
Again, this analysis uses school-level as opposed to student-level data, but it is worth 
nothing the methodology through which a student is assigned to a particular subgroup. Each 
student within a school is simultaneously classified within a minimum of two groupings, the “All 
Student” group and one racial/ethnic group. Whether or not the student also qualifies for 
entrance into the three remaining subgroups (limited English proficiency, students with 
disabilities, or the economically disadvantaged) is dependent upon specific student 
characteristics. Therefore, students can be simultaneously classified within multiple subgroups. 
How does this classification process impact the study as designed? More specifically, what are 
the implications of a student within an unbounded group being simultaneously classified within a 
bounded group? The data available do not allow for the identification of individual cases 
simultaneous classification. Moreover, treatment as defined within this study consists of a school 
being held independently responsible for a particular subgroup. We examine how formal binding 
requirements impact the performance of a subset of students, and in essence determine the 
                                                 
16
 Subgroup Population Achievement REquirements (SPARE) 
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impact of targeting particular categories of students within a school. Consequently, treatment is 
defined at an aggregate level. Therefore, if results indicate that unbounded groups outperform 
their bounded counterparts and we are unable to examine individual outcomes, simultaneous 
classification becomes a viable explanation. A student may receive additional attention due to 
membership in a bounded subgroup that can translate into increased performance of an 
unbounded group.  
To validate the use of a regression discontinuity design, a simple graph of the conditional 
mean outcome must show a discontinuity around the threshold (Wooldridge & Imbens 2007). If 
no evidence of a discontinuity is found, the likelihood of finding a treatment effect with more 
complex methods is unlikely. The figure also aids in selection of functional form.  
The figures below show the mean Meets/Exceeds rate conditioned on the value of the 
centered forcing variable
17
. Again, the running variable is defined as the number of Full 
Academic Year (FAY) students tested within a particular subject and subgroup. If this count 
exceeds the threshold value, as determined by the GADOE rule defined in Equation (11), the 
subgroup requirement is binding. We subtract the appropriate threshold value, Xc, from the 
number of Full Academic Year students tested within a given subgroup and subject, Xi, to 
calculate the centered forcing variable, (Xi-Xc). The now centered variable is more easily 
interpreted as all values greater than or equal to zero indicate a bounded subgroup, while all 
values less than zero indicate an unbounded subgroup. 
Visual inspection shows a discontinuity in the conditional mean at the threshold, with 
those subject to the subgroup requirement performing better than their unbounded counterparts.  
The graphs do not eliminate a linear relationship between the outcome and forcing variable, but 
                                                 
17
 Figures 8 and 9 are for all subgroup observations combined; Graphs for individual subgroups can be found in 
Appendix E. 
   
60 
 
 
Figure 8. Average Meets/Exceeds Rate in Mathematics for Bounded and Unbounded Subgroups 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average Meets/Exceeds Rate in ELA for Bounded and Unbounded Subgroups 
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suggest the need for more tests to determine functional form.   
Theory allows for the forcing variable to be correlated with outcome, as long as the 
correlation itself has no discontinuities. For example, as previous literature has implied the 
poverty concentration and therefore the Free or Reduced Lunch subgroup enrollment may be 
correlated with student outcomes. However, this relationship must be continuous in order for 
RDD to produce valid results. Another way of stating the previous assumption is to assume that 
schools are unable to precisely manipulate the forcing variable, creating randomized variation in 
the treatment near the cutoff point (Lee & Lemieux 2010).  The assumption is pivotal because if 
it holds then any discontinuity in the distribution of the outcome (Yi) conditioned on the forcing 
variable (Xi) at the cutoff point can be interpreted as the causal effect of the treatment 
(Wooldridge & Imbens 2007). The running variable, the number of Full Academic Year (FAY) 
students, is calculated based on student enrollment. In order to qualify as FAY students must be 
continuously enrolled in the same school from the Fall Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) count 
through the end of the state testing window
18
. The continuous enrollment requirement implies 
that the Fall FTE gives the maximum number of students present within each subgroup. 
Therefore, manipulation of the forcing variable would require removing or eliminating students 
from the FAY category. Testing for possible forcing variable manipulation is an important step 
in any regression discontinuity design. Wooldridge and Imbens (2007) suggest a testing 
methodology that involves visual inspection of the density of the forcing variable around the 
cutoff point. The suggested graph divides the centered forcing variable into bins surrounding the 
cutoff point with the bin width defined such that no bin lies on both sides of the cutoff. For the 
purposes of this study the bin width is equal to one. The bin mid-point is then plotted against 
                                                 
18
 Fall FTE Count occurs on the first Tuesday in October; Testing Window for the GHSGT ends in March; Testing 
Window for CRCT ends in April or May 
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Figure 10. Density of the Forcing Variable 
 
 
the number of observations falling into each bin. The resulting graph, depicted in Figure 10, 
shows a lack of discontinuity at the cutoff point and therefore RD is deemed an appropriate 
design
19
. The average causal effect of treatment at the discontinuity point can be written as: 
                                    τSRD = E [Yi(1) – Yi(0) | Xi =c], where c is the cutoff                             (12) 
The simplest form of the model is as follows: 
                          Yi = β0 + β1wi + β2(Xi – Xc) + β3(Xi – Xc)*wi  + Zi + ei                       (13) 
 
               In the specification outlined in Equation (13), the variable of interest is β1, as it predicts 
the treatment effect. Again, the running variable, Xi, is centered for ease of interpretation. An 
                                                 
19
 The McCrary density test, developed in McCrary (2008), uses local linear estimation to look for the presence of a 
discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable. The forcing variable in this study is discrete and therefore use of 
the McCrary density test may not be appropriate. However, in the interest of exploration the McCrary test is 
performed and the results indicate no discontinuity in the forcing variable at the cutoff value. Results are available 
upon request. 
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interaction term between the centered running variable and the treatment variable is added to 
allow the slope of the treatment variable to vary on either side of the cutoff point. Additional 
covariates are represented by the vector Zi.  
The discrete nature of the running variable does not allow for the comparison of 
observations in “arbitrarily” small windows surrounding the cutoff point, which is the 
methodology used in non-parametric RD estimation.  Instead, estimation of the treatment effect 
is performed using a flexible polynomial as data not near the cutoff are included (Card et al. 
2004; Oreopoulos 2006; Lee & Card 2008; Guiteras 2008; van der Klaauw 2002). Determining 
the correct functional form of the relationship between the assignment variable and the outcome 
variables is crucial to obtaining unbiased estimates. Visual inspection of Figures 8 and 9, along 
with goodness of fit statistics are used to determine functional form.  Since visual inspection 
suggests a nonlinear relationship, goodness of fit statistics are used to test polynomials up to the 
fourth degree. Two such statistics are implemented. The first, presented by Lee and Card (2008), 
is used in the case of a discrete running variable with heteroskedastic variance. The second is the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) measure. The results of all testing do not show a distinct 
advantage in the usage of higher order functional forms. Therefore, in the interest of robustness 
all models are estimated using both linear and quadratic forms
20
. Lee and Card (2008) also 
suggest clustering standard errors at values of the discrete running variable to account for group 
structure and obtain consistent estimates
21
. 
 The inclusion of covariates within a regression discontinuity design can help to decrease 
sample biases arising from the use of values of the forcing variable not close to the cutoff.  The 
                                                 
20
 Robustness checks are conducted using varying bandwidths and functional forms. Estimates using a cubic form at 
bandwidths of 10, 20, and 30 students were also performed and are available upon request.  
21
 Each observation of the outcome is weighted by the number of tested students. We use the ‘aweight’ command in 
STATA to take into account the number of students generating the Meets/Exceeds percentage.  
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covariates included here are those that can be found in a traditional education production 
function. As the model is specified at the school-level, all covariates are measured at the school-
level as well. The first covariate is the share of students qualifying for Free or Reduced Lunch 
and measures socio-economic composition. Measures of educational resources, such as teacher 
experience and the pupil-to-teacher ratio are also used. Prior to inclusion, the distributions of all 
covariates were tested for discontinuities near the cutoff value. These tests are done to ensure 
that the covariates used are appropriate for inclusion in the RD design. Testing was performed 
using two methods. First, we perform a “placebo test” in which we re-estimate the RD design 
using each covariate as the dependent variable (Wooldridge & Imbens 2007). Significance of the 
treatment variable would indicate a discontinuity in the covariate at the cutoff point, and 
therefore make the use of that covariate inappropriate. For all the covariates tested, the treatment 
variable remained insignificant and therefore no discontinuities were found. We also perform a 
visual inspection by constructing graphs showing the average value of each covariate by the 
centered forcing variable. The graph divides the forcing variable into bins surrounding the cutoff 
point, with bin width equal to one. We then plot the average value of the covariate within each 
bin against the bin mid-points (Wooldridge & Imbens 2007). All densities were found to be 
continuous in the forcing variable
22
. Based on the results as outlined above, all covariates tested 
are appropriate for inclusion in the RD design. We also include indicator dummies for school 
type to account for the possibility of differential effects for primary, middle, and high schools. 
Another issue of concern is whether or not the structure of the assessments administered 
changed during the time frame examined. Research shows that several changes were made to the 
Georgia High School Graduation Test (GHSGT). The test was enhanced to meet NCLB and 
SSAS standards. Changes were also made to Criterion-Referenced Competency Test (CRCT), 
                                                 
22
 Graphical representations of the densities of covariates are available upon request. 
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and proficiency standards were increased to adhere to Georgia Performance Standards. 
Differences in test structure across years can create shifts in the average difficulty of the test and 
limit comparisons across time. To account for this possibility, we include year effects in all 
models.  
The last issue to be addressed is the bounded nature of the dependent variable. The 
Meets/Exceeds rate is the percentage of students who meet the standard and is therefore bounded 
by zero and one.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression can be problematic as the predicted 
values are not guaranteed to be within the bounded interval. One course of action suggests using 
the log-odds transformation, log[y/(1-y)], to map the dependent variable. The transformed 
dependent variable can then be used in OLS regression. However, this method is only viable if 
the dependent variable lies strictly between zero and one. As our data contains observations at 
the boundary values, this method is not applicable. Also, using the log-odds transformation 
yields estimation coefficients that are often difficult to interpret. Instead, we use the fractional 
logistic method developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The authors develop a generalized 
linear model that uses quasi-maximum likelihood estimation to obtain results. The first 
advantage of this method is the inclusion of boundary values, and the second centers around 
coefficient interpretation. When partial effects from the fractional logistic regression model are 
evaluated at sample averages, the results become comparable to the coefficients obtained using 
linear regression. Therefore, all models are estimated using both OLS and the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation method as outlined by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The results from 
each method are then compared.  
 The regression discontinuity model as described yields the mean effect of binding 
subgroup requirements on performance. However, the average effect can mask results that 
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become apparent when examining various points in the distribution of passage rates.  For 
example, an insignificant mean effect may be the result of gains made at the lower end of the 
distribution being negated by losses suffered towards the top. For this reason, we employ a 
quantile regression discontinuity analysis to pursue the possibility of heterogeneous treatment 
effects. It is important to note that we are examining passage rates across schools with respect to 
the subgroup(s) examined. Therefore the term “distribution” refers to the distribution of 
Meets/Exceeds rates across schools for the subgroup(s) in question.  
 When estimating quantile treatment effects in a regression discontinuity design, it is 
possible to employ the instrumental variable quantile regression model. The link between the 
instrumental variables estimator and the fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design was 
established by Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) as well as Angrist and Lavy (1999). 
More specifically, the estimator used in the FRD is algebraically equivalent to the Wald 
estimator used in the instrumental variables setting. It is important to note that while the two 
estimators are numerically equivalent, both the motivation and assumptions used to justify their 
usage differ (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001). For instance, the instrumental variables 
design requires the instrument selected to be unrelated to the regression error and omitted 
variables. This assumption is not necessary within the FRD framework. Estimates obtained 
within FRD will be consistent as long as the continuity assumption, the assumption that in the 
absence of treatment those on either side of the cutoff would have similar outcomes, is satisfied 
(Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001). The linkage between the FRD and instrumental 
variables estimators allows the use of quantile instrumental variables models when estimating 
heterogeneous effects across outcomes. Note that the subgroup requirement rule as defined by 
GADOE dictates a sharp design. However, as shown by Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) 
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the sharp design can be defined as a special case of the FRD in which the discontinuity in the 
probability of treatment at the cutoff is equal to one. Using this reasoning we investigate the use 
of the instrumental variables quantile method for regression discontinuity designs proposed by 
Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002). To begin, the authors introduce the conditional linear 
quantile regression model as outlined by Koenker and Bassett (1978)  
                                  ( ̂   ̂ )              ∑                                                    (14) 
for any quantile index          , where    is a vector of covariates and    is the treatment 
indicator. Estimates are obtained through the minimization of the check or loss function, 
                 . The model assumes selection on observables and estimates 
conditional effects, meaning the estimates obtained are conditional on the values of model 
covariates. The parameter of interest is the quantile treatment effect, estimated by  ̂ . Abadie, 
Angrist, and Imbens (2002) apply the Koenker and Bassett model to the instrumental variables 
framework through the introduction of a weighting component meant to identify “compliers” or 
observations who participate in treatment if and only if they are selected. However, as is the case 
in this study, the Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens instrumental variables formulation is reduced to 
the Koenker and Bassett conditional quantile estimation presented in Equation (14) if the binary 
treatment variable exactly equals the binary instrument.  
 
Results – Binding Subgroup Requirements 
Regression Discontinuity – Mean Effects 
 If we assume that an increase in the number of subgroup requirements has a negative 
impact on a school’s probability of making AYP, examining the achievement of subgroup 
populations can help to identify the mechanism for this relationship. For example, do the 
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requirements have a negative impact because they do not translate into increased subgroup 
performance? Or is the relationship between additional requirements and increased probability of 
failure a function of an increase in the number of criteria required for passage? 
The first stage of analysis consists of using parametric methods to reconstruct the result 
found in Figures 8 and 9. As stated previously these figures are graphic representations of the 
overall mean effect of the binding requirements across subgroups. The regression discontinuity 
design as outlined in the previous section is implemented on subgroup performance data. 
Bandwidth selection becomes important when parametric estimation is used as observations not 
close to the cutoff are included. When including observations far from the threshold, the 
similarity in characteristics between the treated and non-treated can come into question. It is for 
this reason, that all models are estimated at two bandwidths. The first includes observations +/- 
10 students around the threshold, while the second widens the range and includes observations 
+/- 20 students from the cutoff point.  
To get a baseline estimate for the effect of binding subgroup requirements on student 
performance, we first examine all subgroups collectively. When using OLS, the results indicate a 
small positive impact of requirements. Those subgroups facing binding requirements 
outperformed their counterparts by 1.4 to 3.4 percentage points in mathematics across 
bandwidths and functional forms
23
. The estimated impact in ELA is slightly smaller with a total 
positive effect of 1.1 to 2.6 percentage points. The slightly greater effect for math than for ELA 
is in line with existing literature, and the magnitude of the effect is similar to that seen in Figures 
8 and 9.  Taken together, this evidence suggests a positive but small impact of subgroup 
requirements on student performance. While the evidence presented above is encouraging, it is 
not sufficient. As outlined in the previous section, the fractional nature of the dependent variable 
                                                 
23
 The estimates obtained using OLS can be found in Appendix F 
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requires the use of alternate methods of estimation. The results found using the fractional logit 
model are similar to the OLS results in both sign and magnitude. Across specifications, those 
subject to the binding requirements in mathematics saw a 1.3 to 3.4 percentage point increase in 
the Meets/Exceeds rate, while the ELA estimates are smaller and range from 1.2 to 2.6 
percentage points. While those schools facing subgroup requirements outperformed their 
counterparts, the binding requirements were unable to substantially increase the performance of 
bounded subgroup populations.   
The results presented above examine all subgroups collectively, but the effect of binding 
requirements may differ within subgroups and school type
24
. As evident from Chapter III, 
differential impacts of accountability components exist by school type. Keeping with this result 
we estimate the impact of binding subgroup requirements for elementary, middle, and high 
schools separately. Dividing the population by type not only adheres to previous findings but 
strengthens the validity of the regression discontinuity design as the control and treatment groups 
become more comparable. Tables 12 through 18 display the results by school type for the 
following five categories: all subgroups collectively, Blacks, Hispanics, students with 
disabilities, and the economically disadvantaged
25
.  Positive and significant effects were found 
across all bandwidths, functional forms, and estimation methods when examining all subgroups 
collectively within elementary or primary schools. Results range from 1 to 2.5 percentage points 
for both mathematics and ELA. The subgroup driving this positive impact appears to be students 
with disabilities, as they also experience positive results across all specifications and bandwidths. 
The effects for mathematics and ELA are of relatively equal magnitude for this subgroup.  
                                                 
24
 Analysis for individual subgroups combined across school type is available upon request 
25
 Results presented are limited to the quadratic specification of the subgroups stated above; Linear results and those 
for excluded subgroups are available upon request. Asian, white, and LEP subgroups were not included due to lack 
of statistically significant findings.  
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Table 13. Average Partial Effects of Binding Subgroup Treatment, Primary Schools,  
All Subgroups 
All Subgroups         
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mathematics 
    Treatment 0.0205*** 0.0175*** 0.0236*** 0.0191*** 
 
(0.00609) (0.00522) (0.00732) (0.00545) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     N 17,835 17,811 8,725 8,715 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
    Treatment 0.0191*** 0.0158*** 0.0245*** 0.0193*** 
 
(0.00557) (0.00457) (0.00710) (0.00551) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     N 17,810 17,786 8,716 8,706 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: Fractional logit model with clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%; Dependent variable: Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding the standard; School-level 
Covariates include the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch, the student/teacher ratio, and the 
percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience.  
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However, it is important to note that while bounded SWD groups outperform their counterparts 
the effect is not large in magnitude.  
Over the course of the panel for those schools failing AYP due to inadequate subgroup 
performance, fifty percent show failure within the SWD subgroup. Consequently, for this 
subgroup, and this subgroup only, continuous failure resulted in a systematic and artificial 
increase in the reported achievement for bounded subgroups. Beginning in the 2004-2005 school 
year, schools missing AYP solely due to failure in the SWD category were granted a federal 
adjustment. The adjustment added a proxy percentage to the Meets/Exceeds rate based on the 
percentage of SWD students within the state. For example, during the 2005-2006 school year this 
proxy percentage added 16 percentage points to every qualifying school’s Meets/Exceeds rate for 
students with disabilities. The analysis presented here is performed using the unadjusted rate.  
High schools have the lowest passage rate for AYP. When examining the high school 
population as a whole, positive effects for both mathematics and ELA were found in all 
specifications. The effect in math was found to be larger than that for ELA. Looking at all 
subgroups collectively, the estimates range from two to seven percentage points. When 
examining each subgroup individually, Hispanics saw uniform positive effects across 
specifications. Those subject to the subgroup requirements had an average Meets/Exceeds rate 
that was significantly higher than those not bounded by the requirements. Hispanics were the 
only individual subgroup to see consistently positive effects across bandwidths and 
specifications. Therefore, within high schools, Hispanic students appear to be the group most 
affected by accountability requirements. There is also some evidence suggesting a positive effect 
for the economically disadvantaged. Three specifications saw positive impact for both math and 
ELA. It is important to remember that since this category is not based on racial or ethnic  
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Table 15. Average Partial Effects of Binding Subgroup Requirements, High Schools,  
All Subgroups 
All Subgroups  
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mathematics 
    
Treatment 0.0423*** 0.0444*** 0.0654*** 0.0633*** 
 
(0.00979) (0.00898) (0.0113) (0.0111) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     
N 4,526 4,517 2,007 2,004 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
    
Treatment 0.0214** 0.0278** 0.0332** 0.0358** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0158) (0.0161) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     
N 4,521 4,512 2,011 2,008 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: Fractional logit model with clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%;  
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Dependent variable: Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding  
the standard; School-level Covariates include the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch,  
the student/teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience. 
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Table 17. Average Partial Effects of Binding Subgroup Requirements, Middle Schools, All Subgroups 
All Subgroups  
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mathematics 
    
Treatment -0.0160 -0.00910 0.0277 0.0183 
 
(0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0327) (0.0374) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     
N 4,373 4,345 2,201 2,190 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
    
Treatment -0.0139 -0.00351 0.0293** 0.0292 
 
(0.0171) (0.0202) (0.0140) (0.0201) 
Include Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Include School-Level Covariates? No Yes No Yes 
     
N 4,371 4,343 2,189 2,178 
Bandwidth 20 20 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: Fractional logit model with clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%;  
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Dependent variable: Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding  
the standard; School-level Covariates include the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch,  
the student/teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience. 
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makeup, it encompasses a broader range of students. And as is evident from Figures 4-7, the 
trend lines for performance of Blacks and Hispanics often closely follow that of the 
economically disadvantaged. Therefore, improvement within the economically disadvantaged 
could indirectly result in small improvements within certain racial categories and vice versa.  
Middle schools saw no overall positive impacts for subgroup requirements.  In fact, 
estimates for the Black subgroup were negative and significant in several specifications for both 
math and ELA. These results suggest that the impact of subgroup requirements for Blacks was at 
best neutral and at worst detrimental to ELA achievement in middle schools. This neutral to 
negative result is in line with a section of the literature that suggests Blacks are negatively 
impacted by accountability systems (Kane & Staiger 2003; Cronin et. al., 2005; Hanushek & 
Raymond, 2005; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigor 2009). However, we must also note that the widest 
variation in student population, and therefore cutoff values, occurs within the middle school 
sample. In all other categories, separation by school type decreases the variation in student 
population and cutoff values, thereby making populations more comparable.  
Regression Discontinuity – Quantile Estimation 
The results above indicate a small but positive average effect of binding requirements on 
subgroup performance.  However, it is possible that the effect differs by quantile or specific 
percentiles within the Meets/Exceeds rate distribution. To be clear, when describing quantiles in 
reference to subgroup performance we are referring to the distribution of the Meets/Exceeds rate 
(MER) for a given subgroup across schools. For example, a Black subgroup in the 90
th
 percentile 
has a Meets/Exceeds rate that is higher than 90 percent of Black subgroups across all schools. 
We again focus on narrow windows around the cutoff point, estimate both linear and quadratic 
specifications, and split the sample by school type to make the treatment and control groups 
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more comparable. The mean treatment effect in mathematics for elementary schools with respect 
to all subgroups was positive and small in magnitude. Quantile estimation yields similar results. 
When examining all subgroups collectively, positive effects are found in both ELA and 
mathematics. Estimates also indicate that these effects are largest and most significant at lower 
percentiles. These results suggest that under-performing subgroups, or those towards the lower 
end of the MER distribution, benefit most from the binding subgroup requirements. As depicted 
in Figures 4-7, Blacks, Hispanics, SWD, and the economically disadvantaged are under-
performing relative to all others. Therefore, we focus on these four categories when performing 
individual subgroup analyses. 
Among Blacks in elementary school, the binding subgroup requirement actually has a 
statistically significant negative impact in ELA for the bottom portion of the distribution. Across 
specifications, estimates at the 25
th
 quantile show an approximately two percentage points 
advantage for unbounded subgroups over bounded groups. This difference is underestimated by 
the mean effect. There is no consistent evidence supporting a negative or positive effect on the 
economically disadvantaged or Hispanics in elementary schools.  However, similar to the mean 
effects discussed in the previous subsection, students with disabilities show positive and 
significant effects in both mathematics and ELA. The largest effects are seen in the upper tails. 
Estimates range from two to six percentage points for mathematics, and one to six percentage 
points for ELA. Both of which are larger than the mean effect. Therefore high-performing 
schools with respect to the SWD subgroup generate the greatest gains from the binding 
requirements.  
The pattern when looking at all high school subgroups collectively is similar to the results 
found in the previous subsection. We see a positive effect in both mathematics and ELA, with 
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larger effects in the lower end of the distribution. Therefore, we again focus on the impact for 
Hispanics, students with disabilities, and the economically disadvantaged. The Black subgroup is 
excluded from this discussion as the majority of estimates were negative but insignificant. Again, 
suggesting that binding requirements were at best neutral in improving achievement among 
Black students in high school. For Hispanic subgroups in the upper quantiles, binding 
requirements had positive and significant effects in mathematics. For those scoring in the 90
th
 
quantile, the requirements were associated with a five to ten percentage point increase in the 
Meets/Exceeds rate. The economically disadvantaged also saw large positive effects for 
mathematics in higher quantiles with no evidence of positive or significant effects in the lower 
end of the distribution. For instance, estimates at the 80
th
 quantile show that bounded subgroups 
have a MER six to eight percentage points higher than unbounded subgroups. Hispanics also saw 
positive treatment effects within ELA scores. However, unlike mathematics the effects are not 
concentrated in the upper end of the distribution. Hispanic subgroups scoring in the 40
th
 quantile 
see a treatment effect of four to eight percentage points, while those scoring in the 80
th
 quantile 
display a treatment effect of four to six percentage points. In conclusion, when examining high 
schools it appears under-performing subgroup categories such as Hispanics, the economically 
disadvantaged, and SWD benefit from binding requirements. However, the benefits are 
somewhat concentrated in the upper quantiles of these subgroups, suggesting that high-achieving 
Hispanic, ED, or SWD high schools are more able to adjust student performance in response to 
the binding requirements than their low-achieving counterparts. 
Middle schools were the only category to show no overall positive effects of binding 
requirements in mathematics or ELA. The most interesting result is the negative and significant 
effect found in mathematics for Blacks in the upper end of the distribution. The 75
th
 quantile of  
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Table 19. Quantile Effects of Binding Subgroup Requirements, Primary Schools 
Subgroup Categories Mean Effect 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mathematics 
      All Subgroups 0.0191*** 0.0181 0.0315** 0.0213 0.0106 -0.00550 
 
(0.00545) (0.0228) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0102) (0.0134) 
       Blacks -0.0214* -0.0387 -0.0187 -0.0215 -0.0146 -0.0377** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0227) (0.0181) (0.0169) 
       Hispanics 0.00412 0.0506 0.0162 -0.0369 0.00602 0.0138 
 
(0.00772) (0.0500) (0.0370) (0.0340) (0.0349) (0.0292) 
       Students with Disabilities  0.0443*** 0.0310 0.0298* 0.0413** 0.0558*** 0.0462** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0203) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0192) (0.0217) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.0239 0.0347 0.0295 0.00949 0.0102 0.0563* 
 
(0.0175) (0.0598) (0.0493) (0.0403) (0.0395) (0.0326) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
      All Subgroups 0.0193*** 0.0365*** 0.0255** 0.0182* 0.0188** 0.0167** 
 
(0.00551) (0.0136) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.00813) (0.00676) 
       Blacks -0.0115 -0.0362 -0.0117 0.00124 -0.0168* -0.00603 
 
(0.00916) (0.0302) (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0101) (0.0116) 
       Hispanics -0.0112 -0.0352 -0.0344 -0.00242 0.0206 0.0105 
 
(0.0104) (0.0366) (0.0271) (0.0184) (0.0198) (0.0215) 
       Students with Disabilities  0.0405*** 0.0156 0.0377** 0.0362** 0.0412*** 0.0627*** 
 
(0.00748) (0.0168) (0.0183) (0.0161) (0.0116) (0.0149) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.00887 0.0229 0.0326 0.0102 -0.000649 0.0124 
 
(0.0144) (0.0735) (0.0364) (0.0229) (0.0171) (0.0259) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Time dummies and the following school-
level covariates included in all models: the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch, the 
student/teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience; Dependent variable: 
Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding the standard. 
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Table 20. Quantile Effects of Binding Subgroup Requirements, High Schools 
Subgroup Categories Mean Effect 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mathematics 
      All Subgroups 0.0633*** 0.117** 0.0806 0.0519** 0.0386 0.0217 
 
(0.0111) (0.0572) (0.0492) (0.0257) (0.0359) (0.0267) 
       Blacks -0.00679 0.00976 -0.00913 0.00524 -0.0383 -0.0374 
 
(0.0228) (0.0523) (0.0533) (0.0445) (0.0653) (0.0578) 
       Hispanics 0.112*** 0.177* 0.0882 0.0599 0.0928** 0.102* 
 
(0.0302) (0.0966) (0.0628) (0.0590) (0.0412) (0.0573) 
       Students with Disabilities  0.0311 0.0644 0.0823 0.0554 -0.00332 0.00791 
 
(0.0286) (0.0679) (0.0517) (0.0529) (0.0631) (0.0871) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.0471*** -0.0676 -0.00683 0.0529 0.102** -0.00737 
 
(0.0162) (0.0649) (0.0485) (0.0375) (0.0415) (0.0602) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
      All Subgroups 0.0358** 0.0238 0.0634 0.0375 0.00483 0.00543 
 
(0.0161) (0.0504) (0.0531) (0.0295) (0.0184) (0.0123) 
       Blacks 0.00181 -0.0313 -0.00710 0.0103 -0.0341 0.00507 
 
(0.00813) (0.0594) (0.0254) (0.0229) (0.0259) (0.0245) 
       Hispanics 0.102*** 0.141 0.109* 0.0827*** 0.103** 0.0241 
 
(0.0209) (0.0972) (0.0622) (0.0282) (0.0500) (0.0519) 
       Students with Disabilities  -0.00925 -0.0119 0.00765 0.00225 0.00123 -0.0205 
 
(0.0193) (0.0582) (0.0565) (0.0487) (0.0500) (0.0361) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.0343*** 0.0545 0.0301 0.0289 0.0357 0.0272 
 
(0.00980) (0.0335) (0.0260) (0.0243) (0.0452) (0.0333) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Time dummies and the following school-
level covariates included in all models: the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch, the 
student/teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience; Dependent variable: 
Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding the standard.
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Table 21. Quantile Effects of Binding Subgroup Requirements, Middle Schools 
Subgroup Categories Mean Effect 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mathematics 
      All Subgroups 0.0183 -0.0293 -0.0288 0.0167 0.0332 0.0393 
 
(0.0374) (0.0313) (0.0280) (0.0264) (0.0424) (0.0419) 
       Blacks 0.0264 -0.0218 0.0129 -0.0648 -0.0172 0.00551 
 
(0.0351) (0.119) (0.0967) (0.0811) (0.109) (0.0702) 
       Hispanics -0.0365** 0.0615 -0.0279 -0.0576 0.0120 0.0315 
 
(0.0180) (0.0808) (0.0526) (0.0360) (0.0351) (0.0509) 
       Students with Disabilities  -0.00922 -0.0268 -0.00740 0.00405 0.00996 0.00247 
 
(0.0337) (0.0369) (0.0231) (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0383) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.0129 0.0689 0.0975 0.0169 -0.0611 -0.183 
 
(0.0562) (0.156) (0.152) (0.142) (0.161) (0.143) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
ELA 
      All Subgroups 0.0292 -0.00193 0.000614 0.0237 0.0346* 0.0230 
 
(0.0201) (0.0355) (0.0362) (0.0176) (0.0197) (0.0186) 
       Blacks 0.0271 0.0346 0.0591 0.0539 0.0292 0.0268 
 
(0.0267) (0.218) (0.0575) (0.0480) (0.0229) (0.0291) 
       Hispanics -0.00894 0.0209 0.00781 0.0121 -0.0240 -0.0295 
 
(0.0148) (0.0538) (0.0234) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0477) 
       Students with Disabilities  0.000606 -0.00258 -0.0430 -0.0224 0.0136 0.0206 
 
(0.0182) (0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0252) (0.0272) (0.0282) 
       Economically Disadvantaged 0.0302 -0.0654 0.0180 -0.0330 -0.0316 -0.0616 
 
(0.0473) (0.105) (0.0958) (0.0704) (0.0726) (0.0732) 
       Bandwidth 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Functional Form Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
NOTE: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Time dummies and the following school-
level covariates included in all models: the percentage of all students receiving Free or Reduced Lunch, the 
student/teacher ratio, and the percentage of teachers with less than one year’s experience; Dependent variable: 
Percentage of students Meeting/Exceeding the standard.
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MER for bounded Black subgroups is four to eight percentage points lower than their unbounded 
counterparts. It is important to note that negative estimates for Blacks in mathematics were 
present in both primary and high schools, but middle schools were the only category in which the 
effects were both negative and significant. Again, when considering the effect of minority 
concentration on Black students the negative effects obtained are in accordance with literature. 
Overall, the results show a lack of positive response to binding requirements for middle schools.  
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Chapter V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The structure of Georgia’s accountability system translates certain school characteristics 
into accountability components. School demographics are used to determine the number of 
binding subgroups, and underperformance leads to corrective measures. Using an unbalanced 
panel covering the school years 2004-2011, we investigate the impact of these characteristics on 
satisfying Adequate Yearly Progress
26
. The application of sanctions appears to have a positive 
impact on school performance. Schools facing sanctions in the previous year were more likely to 
meet standards. However, the magnitude of the impact was relatively small. Increasing the 
number of binding requirements has a negative impact on probability of passage. Similar to 
results found in literature, our findings imply heterogeneous schools or those facing a greater 
number of binding subgroup requirements fare worse than their homogenous counterparts. This 
effect remains when accounting for the previous year’s performance.  
It is important to note the possibility of spillover effects on unbounded populations when 
examining the impact of binding requirements. The impact of these effects can be positive or 
negative. When students of a bounded group are present in a class also containing unbounded 
students, instructors may reallocate time and resources towards the bounded group at the expense 
of the rest of the class. However, it is also possible that the presence of a bounded subgroup 
                                                 
26
 As a robustness check models are also estimated using balanced subset only. The results obtained are similar to 
those found using the unbalanced panel and are available upon request.  
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increases the quality of instruction and resources available to the class as a whole; thus creating a 
positive impact of binding requirements for students in both bounded and unbounded subgroups. 
Determining the significance and direction of spillover effects is a topic for future research, as it 
requires the comparison of unbounded subgroups across schools and varying levels of binding 
requirements.  
While each proxy for school resources has the expected sign, having inexperienced 
teachers yields a result that is larger than expected. One possible explanation being the 
percentage of inexperienced teachers serves a proxy not only for school resources, but for overall 
school quality. State dependence plays a factor in determining passage rate as those meeting the 
standard in the previous year are more likely to pass in the current. However, similar to the 
accountability measures examined, the magnitude of the effect is relatively small. When 
examining all schools collectively, high schools are least likely to meet AYP, but the 
mechanisms for this remain unclear.  
Accountability components have statistically significant but relatively small impacts on 
whether or not a school meets AYP. However, factors relating to the school resources, quality, 
and type appear to have a greater influence. Despite this, the negative impact of binding 
subgroup requirements on passage rates calls into question if these measures can be effective in 
increasing student performance. While AYP status is a global measure of a schools well-being, it 
is a binary and by definition does not allow for measuring improvements in student achievement. 
Gains in student performance and AYP failure can occur simultaneously if the gains made are 
insufficient to meet the Annual Measureable Objective. For this reason, a regression 
discontinuity design was implemented to determine if binding requirements had a positive 
impact on subgroup performance. The outcome of interest measures the percentage of students 
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within each subgroup who meet or exceed the standard. The initial estimates, when examining all 
subgroups collectively, indicate a slight positive impact of binding requirements on both 
mathematics and ELA performance. Next, we explored the possibility of heterogeneous effects 
by both subgroup and school type. Distinguishing by subgroup allows for the possibility of 
varying effects by race, ethnicity, disability, and socio-economic status. Stratifying the sample by 
school type increases the comparability of the subsamples examined. Positive effects on student 
achievement were found but concentrated within different subgroups dependent upon school 
type. In elementary schools, students with disabilities were the only group to show positive and 
statistically significant gains from binding requirements. Within high schools, improvements in 
student performance were concentrated within Hispanics and the economically disadvantaged. 
For middle schools, no positive effects were found and the performance of Blacks appeared to 
suffer from the implementation of subgroup requirements.  
While the mean effect was determined to be small but positive in nature, differences in 
both magnitude and sign are possible when examining different points in the performance 
distribution. For this reason, we employed quantile estimation. When examining all subgroups 
collectively, those in the lower end of the distribution benefited most from binding requirements. 
During the time period studied Blacks, Hispanics, students with disabilities, and the 
economically disadvantaged were considered lower-performing relative to all others. Therefore, 
these groups appear to generate the positive results found when examining all subgroups 
collectively. Heterogeneous effects may exist within individual groups, and it is for this reason 
that quantile estimates were obtained for each group separately. Similar to the mean effects 
discussed, within elementary schools students with disabilities bounded by requirements 
outperform their counterparts in both mathematics and ELA. Gains are seen throughout the entire 
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distribution and not confined to high or low achievers. However, the greatest gains were seen 
towards the upper end of the distribution. When examining high schools, gains are concentrated 
in the upper ends of the mathematics distribution for both Hispanics and the economically 
disadvantaged. Therefore, higher performing schools, with respect to these particular subgroups, 
showed the greatest improvements in student performance. While historically underperforming 
subgroups appear to benefit from binding requirements, it is the higher achieving schools with 
respect to these subgroups that benefit most. The ELA results for Hispanic subgroups are similar 
as those high schools in the middle to upper ends of the distribution benefit most.  
 In conclusion, our results indicate that imposing sanctions on failing schools has a 
positive impact on the probability these schools will meet AYP in the following year. Therefore, 
sanctions are an effective mechanism for improved school performance. Our findings mirror 
those found in previous literature which highlights the importance of sanction severity and 
credibility. During the 2006-2011 time period, an average of 117 schools per year faced possible 
restructuring – the most severe sanction available under Georgia’s SSAS. The consequential 
structure of Georgia’s accountability system, which mandates the sanction of failing schools, 
served to increase performance and decrease the probability of repeated failures.  
NCLB implemented the use of subgroup classifications to ensure the performance of 
under-represented groups was not overlooked in the calculation of AYP. Chapter III of this 
dissertation shows that as the count of binding requirements increases within a school, the 
probability of AYP passage decreases.  Therefore, these findings imply that heterogeneous 
schools have a lower probability of passage than their more homogenous counterparts. However, 
the mechanism for the decrease in probability of passage remains unidentified. The results of 
Chapter IV of this dissertation indicate that bounded groups outperformed unbounded groups 
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within the SWD, Hispanic, and ED subgroups. However, the magnitudes of these effects were 
relatively small and largest in comparatively higher performing schools. The persistence of the 
achievement gap mandates the need for targeting subgroup populations; however the results as 
presented suggest the need to re-evaluate binding requirements as the tool used to accomplish 
this goal. The requirements do not yield substantial growth in all targeted populations, and may 
prove detrimental to heterogeneous schools in relation to AYP passage. Any method 
implemented must acknowledge the obstacles faced by schools whose student body contains a 
large percentage of disadvantaged students.  
While there may be unintended negative consequences of binding subgroup requirements 
on the probability of passing AYP, there is also evidence to suggest that bounded subgroups 
marginally outperform their unbounded counterparts. Therefore, the mechanism for detrimental 
impact of binding subgroup requirements on passing AYP is undetermined. Increases in the 
number of passage requirements could create downward pressure on probability of passing or 
generate improvements in student performance for bounded groups that are insufficient relative 
to the proficiency threshold. However, it is important to note that this study investigates student 
performance as a whole and does not address student performance in relation to the AMO set by 
the state. The impact of subgroup requirements with respect to a schools ability to meet AMOs is 
a subject for future research.  
Beginning in the 2012-2013 school year, Georgia implemented the College and Career 
Ready Performance Index (CCRPI) which eliminated subgroup binding requirements as defined 
by NCLB. The new system uses a combination of indicators measuring overall school 
performance, individual student growth, and the relative performance of low-achieving students. 
The index also contains specific measures regarding students with disabilities, those with limited 
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English proficiency, and the economically disadvantaged. However, examining the performance 
of these subgroups is not a central component of the index, and is simply used as a method for 
earning additional points. It has yet to be determined if Georgia’s new system, with the complete 
elimination of specific subgroup requirements, will result in improved scores for disadvantaged 
populations. Comparing the outcomes of these groups under NCLB and CCRPI is a question for 
future research.  
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Appendix A: Annual Measurable Objectives 
Georgia's Annual Measureable Objectives (AMOs) 
  
      English/Language Arts   
  
Mathematics 
CRCT Grades 3-8 
  
CRCT Grades 3-8 
School Year 
% of Students Meeting or 
Exceeding Standard 
  
School Year 
% of Students Meeting 
or Exceeding Standard 
2002-2003 60 
  
2002-2003 50 
2003-2004 60 
  
2003-2004 50 
2004-2005 66.7 
  
2004-2005 58.3 
2005-2006 66.7 
  
2005-2006 58.3 
2006-2007 66.7 
  
2006-2007 58.3 
2007-2008 73.3 
  
2007-2008 59.5 
2008-2009 73.3 
  
2008-2009 59.5 
2009-2010 73.3 
  
2009-2010 67.6 
2010-2011 80 
  
2010-2011 75.7 
2011-2012 86.7 
  
2011-2012 83.8 
2012-2013 93.3 
  
2012-2013 91.9 
2013-2014 100 
  
2013-2014 100 
      English/Language Arts   
  
Mathematics 
GHSGT  
  
GHSGT  
School Year 
% of Students Meeting or 
Exceeding Standard 
  
School Year 
% of Students Meeting 
or Exceeding Standard 
2002-2003 88 
  
2002-2003 81 
2003-2004 81.6 
  
2003-2004 62.3 
2004-2005 81.6 
  
2004-2005 62.3 
2005-2006 84.7 
  
2005-2006 68.6 
2006-2007 84.7 
  
2006-2007 68.6 
2007-2008 87.7 
  
2007-2008 74.9 
2008-2009 87.7 
  
2008-2009 74.9 
2009-2010 87.7 
  
2009-2010 74.9 
2010-2011 90.8 
  
2010-2011 76 
2011-2012 93.9 
  
2011-2012 84 
2012-2013 96.9 
  
2012-2013 92 
2013-2014 100 
  
2013-2014 100 
      Following the March 2005 administration of the Enhanced GHSGT, AMOs reset for High Schools. 
Following the Spring 2008 administration of the mathematics CRCT, AMOs for grades 3-8 reset. 
Following the Spring 2011 administration of the mathematics GHSGT, AMOs reset for High Schools. 
 
Source: State of Georgia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook, U.S. Department of Education 
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Appendix B: Graduation Rate Requirements for Second Indicator of AYP 
High School Second Indicator 
Graduation Rate 
  School 
Year High School AYP Second Indicator 
  Graduation Standard 
2006-2007 65 % or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 65% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 50% 
2007-2008 70% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 70% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 50% 
2008-2009 75% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 75% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 55% 
2009-2010 80% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 80% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 60% 
2010-2011 85% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 85% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 60% 
2011-2012 90% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 90% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 70% 
2012-2013 95% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 95% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 70% 
2013-2014 100% or greater; OR 
  1) Apply multi-year average to achieve 100% 
  2) Increase by 10% from the preceding year from a minimum threshold of 80% 
  NOTE: From 2002-2006 the Graduation Standard was set at 60% 
Source: State of Georgia Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook, U.S. Department of    
Education 
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Appendix C: Transition from Quality Core Curriculum (QCC) to Georgia Performance 
Standards (GPS). 
 
 
Grade 
School Year GPS  
Used in Testing for 
English / Language Arts 
School Year GPS  
Used in Testing for 
Mathematics 
3 05-06 07-08 
4 05-06 07-08 
5 05-06 07-08 
6 05-06 05-06 
7 05-06 06-07 
8 05-06 07-08 
11 07-08 10-11 
 
 
Training in the new GPS curriculum was given in the school year directly preceding 
implementation for Grades 3-8. 
 
Training for the GPS High School Math Curriculum was administered in the 2007-2008 school 
year. The new curriculum was then implemented for all ninth graders entering in the 2008-2009 
school year culminating in GPS standards being used on the Math portion of the GHSGT 
administered to 11th graders in the 2010-2011 school year.  
 
Training for the GPS High School ELA Curriculum was administered in the 2004-2005 school 
year. The new curriculum was implemented for all ninth graders entering in the 2005-2006 
school year culminating in GPS standards being used on the ELA portion of the GHSGT 
administered to 11th graders in 2007-2008 school year.  
 
Source: State of Georgia, Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook, U.S. Department of    
Education 
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Appendix E: Average Meets/Exceeds Rate by Subject and Subgroup 
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